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PROOF AND PREJUDICE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES
D. Craig Lewis*
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court held its 1970 decision In re Winship that in
criminal prosecutions the Constitution requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Professor Lewis argues that Winship governs the validity of evidence rules in criminal
cases and requires that rules of evidence do not impair the reliability of criminal convic-
tions. The author concludes that Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which permits the admis-
sion of prejudicial evidence unless the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
probative value, violates this requirement. Rule 403 substantially increases the risk of
erroneous decisionmaking and prescribes a balancing test that unconstitutionally places
the major risk of decisionmaking error on the defendant. The author proposes a revision
to Rule 403 that would impose on the prosecution, rather than on the defendant, the
burden of showing that probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair preju-
dice. Such a revision would make Rule 403 constitutional under Winship-based reliability
demands.
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The way to do complete justice indeed, is to let in the one side, without
prejudicing the other. 1
Lord Mansfield
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence claim as their overriding purpose the
search for truth and justice.2 However, "truth" and "justice" are flexi-
1. Rex v. Philips, 97 Eng. Rep. 321, 327 (1757).
2. FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed... to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
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ble concepts and must differ in civil and criminal cases to accommo-
date the fundamental societal interest in certainty about the reliability
of a criminal conviction. In a criminal case, a judgment of conviction
reflects an acceptably valid truth and a just result only when there is
no reasonable doubt the defendant committed the charged crime.3
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 plays a central role in the operation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence as a truthseeking procedural code.4 In
recognition that the admission of relevant evidence may threaten the
reliability of the factfinding process, Rule 403 provides a balancing test
by which probative, otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded.5
This basis for the exclusion of evidence applies to nearly every other
provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.6 Nonetheless, Rule 403
3. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (analysis of constitutional reliability demands
in criminal cases). For discussions of the contextual nature of legal "truth," see Damaska,
Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1084-86 (1975)
(characterization of outcome of legal evaluation as "true" or "false" depends on context, and is
meaningful only within a given framework of legal reference); Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search
for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1063-65 (1975) (in society that respects the dignity of an
individual, truthseeking in criminal matters may be subordinate to other values); Nesson,
Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187,
1192-99 (1979) (concepts of statistical probability are inconsistent with values represented by
concept of reasonable doubt); Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction
to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1076-79 (1975) (factual truth in criminal
matters must be distinguished from legal truth).
4. Rule 403 has been described as "the major rule explicitly recognizing the large
discretionary rule [sic] of the judge in controlling the introduction of evidence." 1 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 403[01], at 403-05 (1988). "[Rule 403] finds its roots
in Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence, a provision that the draftsman, Professor Morgan,
described as 'one of the most important sections in the whole Code."' 22 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5211, at 247-48 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
5. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides as follows:
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
6. See Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the
Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1465, 1480 (1985) ("Rule 403 was
intended to have virtually universal application. On its face, the rule purports to apply to any
item of evidence. The commentators have observed that rule 403 'apparently cuts across the
entire body of the Rules,' and that 'every rule of admissibility [is] subject to the power of
discretionary exclusion' under rule 403." (quoting Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1974) and 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 4, § 5213, at 262-63) (footnote.omitted)).
The only exceptions to Rule 403 coverage are found in Rules 412 and 609. Rule 412 prescribes
special procedures and its own balancing test for evidence of past sexual behavior of an alleged
victim of rape or a sexual assault. See infra note 187 (discussion of Rule 412 balancing test).
Rule 609 imposes restrictions on the use of evidence of prior convictions when offered for
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"received virtually no attention by Congress" during the rules consid-
eration process, and was enacted in the identical form submitted by
the Supreme Court.
7
A decision on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 403 requires
a comparative weighing of probative value, as an admission-positive
factor, against six listed admission-negative concerns. Three of these
concerns, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the
jury, are regarded as "dangers" in the rule; the remaining three fac-
tors, undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence, are called "considerations" and present what are clearly
only administrative concerns.
Rule 403 is generic. It provides a balancing equation that is undif-
ferentiated for civil and criminal cases, for evidence offered by the
prosecution or by the accused, or for evidence that threatens prejudice
in the factfinding process or the risk of mere wasting of time. By its
terms, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence because of any of
these concerns only when they "substantially outweigh" the probative
value of the evidence. Even when that test is met the rule does not
mandate exclusion of the evidence; it provides instead that evidence
"may" be excluded when the burden is met.8 The legislative history of
the rule shows it is intended to establish a "burden [that] demands
impeachment purposes, with different balancing tests from that provided by Rule 403. See infra
note 214 (text of Rule 609).
7. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220, 221 (1976).
However, Professor Dolan notes that a prejudice rule substantially similar to Rule 403, proposed
about 30 years earlier in the Model Code of Evidence, had drawn a great deal of scholarly
comment and criticism and may have substantially contributed to the general rejection of that
Code. Id. at 221-22. This criticism appears to have focused on "which factors should be
included in declaring particular evidence prejudicial and on whether the appropriate factors
should be formulated as an independent rule of evidence or considered only supplemental to
various fixed rules of exclusion." Id. at 222 n.5.
The present Rule 403 is a modified version of an original draft rule that distinguished between
mandatory and discretionary grounds for the exclusion of evidence. See infra note 8 (discussion
of changes from original draft).
8. As originally drafted, Rule 403 contained a subpart (a), which provided for the mandatory
exclusion of evidence if its probative value was substantially outweighed by the three prejudicial
"dangers," and a subpart (b) that provided discretionary exclusion for the three time-wasting
"considerations." See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 1 403[01] at 403-6. The rule
was amended to its present form in response to objections that the mandatory language would
invite too much appellate interference with trial court rulings admitting evidence despite
prejudicial dangers. See id. at 403-7 n.4.
Although Rule 403 separately lists "unfair prejudice," "misleading," and "confusion" as
"dangers" addressed by the rule, each presents a risk to reliable factfinding that is
indistinguishable for many purposes in this Article. See infra notes 107-08 (discussion of
reliability impacts of the "misleading" and "confusion" dangers). Accordingly, the term "unfair
prejudice" frequently will be used in this Article to refer to all three of these reliability-
threatening "dangers."
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that the opponent convince the judge that the dangers attendant to
admitting the evidence outweigh the probative value of the evidence
by a wide margin."9 This appears to be the construction favored by
courts.10
The rule bears the imprimatur of its distinguished drafters, Con-
gress, and the Supreme Court-reason, perhaps, for initial skepticism
about a challenge to its validity. Although scholars have questioned
the fairness of the federal rules' treatment of prejudicial evidence,11 no
one has seriously questioned the constitutionality of that treatment. 12
9. Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 1479.
10. See id. at 1473-74. Wright and Graham share this interpretation:
The phrasing of Rule 403 makes it clear that the discretion to exclude does not arise when
the balance between the probative worth and the countervailing factors is debatable; there
must be a significant tipping of the scales against the evidentiary worth of the proferred
evidence. Thus, the appellate court need not find that the trial judge abused his discretion; it
is enough that he erred in concluding that he had any discretion.
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5221, at 309-10 (footnotes omitted); see also
United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.) (primary purpose of Rule 403 is "limited to
excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of
its prejudicial effect"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979).
11. There has been little scholarly consideration of the impacts of Rule 403 on the trial
process. Professor Victor Gold has offered the most extensive critical analysis to date in two
articles: Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidenc 58 WASH. L. REv. 497 (1983) [hereinafter Gold, Observations]; Gold, Limiting
Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 59 (1984)
[hereinafter Gold, Limiting Discretion]. The major premises of these articles are discussed at
length infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. For a descriptive consideration of the rule, see
Dolan, supra note 7.
There has been considerably more scholarly interest in the operation of F D. R. EVID. 404(b),
which governs the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. Uncharged misconduct
evidence is a principal source of admissibility determinations under Rule 403. See infra notes
126-32 and accompanying text (discussion of uncharged misconduct evidence). For example,
Professor Edward Imwinkelried has argued for a revision of Rule 404(b) that would allocate the
burden of establishing admissibility of the evidence to the prosecution. See Imwinkelried, supra
note 6, at 1497. Professor David Leonard recently has proposed a substantial revision of the
treatment of character evidence in Rules 404 and 405 that would substitute a balancing test for
the present outright prohibition. See Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct:
Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. CoO. L. REv. 1, 53-60 (1986-87).
Other authors have proposed a revision of a state counterpart to Rule 404(b) to address policy
concerns raised by that rule. See Krivosha, Lansworth & Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary
Element in Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REv.
657, 677-79 (1981).
12. One commentator who has extensively examined the developing jurisprudence for the
application of Rule 403 to Rule 404(b) determinations has concluded that the jurisprudence
demonstrates a "slow drift toward an inquisitorial criminal trial process violative of the sixth
amendment." Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal
Criminal Trials, 50 U. Ca'. L. REv. 713, 714 (1981) (describing conclusions of subsequently
published article, Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 113 (1984) [hereinafter Reed, Admission After Rules]).
However, the constitutional problem this commentator perceives is an interference with the
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Rule 403 works a substantial change in the preexisting common law
principles governing the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence.'"
Moreover, the rule was drafted and approved during the early stages
of development of the constitutional reasonable doubt standard estab-
lished in In re Winship 4 and prior to the major extensions of Winship
that have found a variety of traditional factfinding control devices con-
stitutionally unacceptable. Under those decisions, the fifth and four-
teenth amendment due process guarantees include assurance that a
criminal conviction will be based on procedures designed to protect
fundamental fairness of the trial process by reason of a lack of a procedural requirement of fair
notice of the evidence, not the constitutional reliability concerns addressed in this Article. Id. at
163-69.
Another author has proposed a revision of the Rule 403 balancing test similar to that
ultimately proposed here. See Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 806-08 (1981). However, his call for change is based on
what he finds a more rational treatment of that evidence, not constitutional concerns. See id. at
803-09.
The Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence of the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section has recently proposed a revision of FED. R. EVID. 404 that
would incorporate a balancing test identical to the test this Article finds constitutionally required
for Rule 403. That proposal is limited, however, to the treatment of evidence of "other crimes,
wrongs, or culpable acts" of an accused and is justified on policy grounds rather than
constitutional requirements. See Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh Review and
Evaluation, 1987 A.B.A. CRIM. J. SEC., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIM. PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE REP., at proposed Rule 405A and accompanying comment.
The only treatise on uncharged misconduct evidence devotes a chapter to constitutional issues
raised by the use of such evidence, including one section that considers the argument advanced
here, that the use of the evidence undermines the constitutionally demanded standard of proof.
E. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 10:11 (1984). That section rejects
the argument without substantive discussion, based on a perceived rejection by the courts.
However, the single case cited in support of the rejection, Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th
Cir. 1974), did not consider the constitutional arguments raised here, and relied instead primarily
on Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) for its holding. See Manning, 507 F.2d at 893-94.
Spencer does not refute the thesis of this Article. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
For a similarly cursory consideration and rejection of due process challenges to the admission of
such evidence, see Bray, Evidence of Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional
Restrictions, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 505 (1974).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuit courts have considered the possible
application of the constitutionally required reasonable doubt standard to decisions on the
admissibility of unfairly prejudicial evidence. See infra note 44 and accompanying text; see also
22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5195, at 203 ("In habeas corpus proceedings
attacking state criminal convictions it is often said that, aside from [fourth amendment search
protections, fifth amendment self-incrimination protections, sixth amendment confrontation
clause rights, and the sixth amendment right to counsel], the admission and exclusion of evidence
raises no constitutional questions.") (footnote omitted).
13. See infra note 132 (discussion of the change in common law burdens produced by Rule
403).
14. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the expectation that the government's burden of proof has established
the defendant's guilt with reasonable certainty. 15
Winship fostered a new dimension of due process in criminal cases,
the parameters of which are still developing, but there has been no
judicial or scholarly investigation of its possible application to proce-
dures for the admission of evidence. For these reasons, an examina-
tion of the relationship between Winship and the constitutionality of
Rule 403 is warranted.
This Article raises a constitutional challenge to the operation of
Rule 403 in criminal cases and, in support of that challenge, presents
two theses not previously advanced by courts or commentators. First,
since Winship the constitutionality of evidentiary rules in criminal tri-
als depends on their compatibility with the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof. Thus, Winship alters the constitutional
framework for the law of evidence in criminal cases. Second, by fail-
ing to distinguish between civil and criminal actions, and by providing
a balancing test that increases the risk of erroneous convictions, Rule
403 strikes an unconstitutional balance for the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence against those accused of crime. In its present
form, Rule 403 fails the Winship test.
Part II of this Article considers the Supreme Court's development
of Winship doctrine as it relates to procedural influences on the deci-
sionmaking process, concluding that Winship prohibits procedures
that impair the reliability of convictions. Part III describes the con-
nection between the application of Rule 403 and the reliability of crim-
inal adjudications and explains that the Rule 403 balancing factors are
measures of the impact of evidence on the reliability of the decision-
making process. This part demonstrates that the effect of the rule in
its present form can be to substantially increase the risk of error in
decisionmaking and concludes that the rule prescribes an unconstitu-
tional balancing test for the admission of evidence offered against an
accused. Part IV proposes a revision of Rule 403 that would meet
constitutional demands in criminal cases. The proposed revision shifts
the burden to the prosecution to show that the probative value of its
offered evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice.
15. See infra notes 16-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Winship and related
decisions).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMAND FOR RELIABILITY
GUARANTEES IN CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURES
A. The Reliability Demands of the Winship Reasonable Doubt
Standard
The Supreme Court's decision in In re Winship purported to pro-
claim only what had "long been assumed": a constitutionally required
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. 6 However, despite that
modest claim there were indications that the Court was making a
major statement about constitutional requirements of reliability for
criminal adjudications. The Court's opinion is laced with references to
the reliability requirements embodied in the reasonable doubt stan-
dard: It notes the aim of the standard "to safeguard men from dubious
and unjust convictions," 7 the role of the standard as "a prime instru-
ment for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error,"18
the fundamental principle represented by the standard's allocation of
the major portion of the "margin of error" in criminal factfinding to
the prosecution, 9 and the importance of the standard as a guarantee
that "[the] government cannot adjudge [a person] guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty."2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan further empha-
sized the reliability precepts of the standard, finding it "bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."'"
It is now clear that Winship provided a radical basis for evaluating
the constitutionality of trial procedures in both criminal and civil
cases. Winship has produced a still-developing inquiry into the valid-
ity of a variety of procedural devices in criminal trials, as well as a new
framework for determining the standard of proof due process requires
16. "Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that
proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required." 397 U.S. at
362. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." Id. at 364.
17. Id. at 362 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)).
18. Id. at 363.
19. There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which
both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as
to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of. . . persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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in civil litigation.22 However, although Winship was the genesis of the
constitutionalized reasonable doubt standard, read narrowly it
required no more than the application of the standard to criminal
cases through the'use of traditionally acceptable trial procedures.
The Slupreme Court's decision five years later in Mullaney v. Wil-
bur23 first indicated that the Winship doctrine concerned more than
the formal burden of proof instruction to a jury in a criminal case and
extended to other procedures that effectively altered that burden on an
element of a crime. In Mullaney a unanimous Court affirmed a First
Circuit decision which had set aside a state murder conviction ren-
dered under a procedure that allocated to the defendant the burden of
proving, in order to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter, that
he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court
based its holding on a conclusion that the effect of the procedure was
to unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the element of
intent.24 Rejecting the contention that the state's definition of the ele-
ments of the crime should control the allocation of the burden of
proof, the Court held that
Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism.
The rationale of that case requires an analysis that looks to the "opera-
tion and effect of the law as applied and enforced by the State," . .. and
to the interests of both the State and the defendant as affected by the
allocation of the burden of proof.
25
Whatever the merit of the result in Mullaney, the decision heralded a
new dimension of criminal due process that demands review of the
substantive effect of procedural devices on the state's burden of
proof.26
22. This framework, derived from the Winship rationale, reflects judgments about the weight
of the public and private interests at stake and the appropriate allocation of the risk of error
between the litigants. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25, 433 (1979) ("clear and
convincing evidence" standard required for involuntary civil commitments); see also Rivera v.
Minnich, 107 S. Ct. 3001, 3002 (1987) (preponderance standard permissible for paternity
determinations); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) ("clear and convincing
evidence" standard required for involuntary termination of parental rights).
23. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
24. See id, at 702.
25. Id. at 699 (footnote omitted) (quoting St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350,
362 (1914)).
26. Mullaney was followed by Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), a decision which,
on similar facts, upheld the state's allocation to the defendant of the burden of proving absence of
malice in a murder prosecution.
For a comparison of Mullaney and Patterson that is critical of Mullaney, see Jeffries &
Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979). For a contrary view, see Saltzburg, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Casesv
297
Washington Law Review Vol. 64:289, 1989
Commentators have found Mullaney and subsequent Winship-based
decisions inconsistently reasoned and in need of a coherent logical
framework.2 7 The issues that have generated this criticism can be gen-
erally summarized: They concern the questions of what are the "ele-
ments" of a crime as to which the government must retain the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,28 and what forms of presumption
or inference may be applied to elements of a crime without unconstitu-
tionally altering the burden of proof.
2 9
There has been, however, no disagreement among commentators or
members of the Court that a procedure is unconstitutional if it inter-
feres with a factfinder's application of the reasonable doubt standard
to a necessary element of the crime charged. In Ulster County Court v.
Allen,30 the Court described the test of the constitutional validity of
"evidentiary devices:"
The value of these evidentiary devices [presumptions and inferences],
and their validity under the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case,
however, depending on the strength of the connection between the par-
ticular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the
Harmonizing the Views of the Justices, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 393 (1983) (finding Mullaney
correctly decided and offering an explanation of its consistency with later decisions).
27. See Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional
Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322-25 (1980); Allen & DeGrazia, The
Constitutional Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment
Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1982); Jeffries &
Stephan, supra note 26, at 1338-44; Schmolesky, County Court of Ulster County v. Allen and
Sandstrom v. Montana: The Supreme Court Lends an Ear But Turns Its Face, 33 RUTGERS L.
REV. 261, 304-308 (1981); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1305 (1977).
28. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state may constitutionally place burden of proof
of self-defense on defendant); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (state may
constitutionally treat "visible possession of firearm" as sentence-enhancing factor, triable by
court on preponderance of evidence standard); Patterson, 432 U.S. 197 (state may
constitutionally define murder without element of malice and shift burden of proving absence of
malice to defendant); Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684 (under statute in question malice was element of
murder, and state could not shift burden of disproving malice to defendant).
For examples of the scholarly debate on these issues, compare Underwood, supra note 27
(arguing that the reasonable doubt standard must apply to every fact relevant to criminal liability
or severity of punishment) with Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 26 (criticizing Underwood and
contending that proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be required only for constitutional
minima for contemplated punishment).
29. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (rebuttable presumption of intent
unconstitutionally shifted burden to defendant); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)
(mandatory presumption of intent unconstitutional); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
(1979) (permissive inference of possession of weapons constitutional where supported by rational
inferences from facts in case).
For examples of scholarly consideration of this question, see Allen, supra note 27, at 332-48,
and Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 412-21.
30. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
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device curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence indepen-
dently. Nonetheless, in criminal cases, the ultimate test of any device's
constitutional validity in a given case remains constant: the device must
not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence
adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.31
The four dissenters in Ulster agreed with this test,32 taking issue
instead with the measure of underlying factual validity the majority
would require to support a permissive inference.33
The issue in Ulster was the legitimacy of a jury instruction, but the
opinion appears to have a broader reach. The Court's declaration of
the constitutional standard did not purport to apply only to instruc-
tions but instead claimed to be the "ultimate test of any device's con-
stitutional validity."'34  An additional passage acknowledged the
possibility of constitutional error whenever there is risk that a proce-
dural influence has threatened irrational behavior by an otherwise
rational factfinder:
Because [a] permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit
or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects
the application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if,
under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make
the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is
there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury,
or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to
make an erroneous factual determination.35
'Ulster thus reiterated a suggestion implicit in Mullaney, that Winship
principles extend to a jury's substantive application of the reasonable
doubt standard as well as to the form of a court's instructions to the
jury.
31. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 169 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell wrote:
[T]he use of presumptions in criminal cases poses at least two distinct perils for defendants'
constitutional rights. The Court accurately identifies the first of these as being the danger of
interference with "the factfmder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id.
33. The majority held that a permissive inference undermines the reasonable doubt standard
"only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection
permitted by the inference." Id at 157. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion argued that to be
constitutional a presumption or inference at least must be more likely than not true as a general
proposition. Id at 168-72.
34. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 157.
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Less than a month later, the Court made explicit what it had sug-
gested in Ulster and Mullaney. In Jackson v. Virginia,36 the Court
held that federal habeas review of a state criminal conviction includes
review of the substantive sufficiency of evidence to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Court stated, "The Winship doctrine requires
more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine establishing so fundamen-
tal a substantive constitutional standard must also require that the
factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence.
A 'reasonable doubt,' at a minimum, is one based upon 'reason.'-3
Thus, due process demands a rational application of the reasonable
doubt standard by the jury to the determination of a defendant's guilt,
as well as formal adherence to the standard in a court's directions to
the jury. However; Mullaney, Ulster, and Jackson left undecided the
question of what risk of departure from the mandates of Winship
would produce constitutional error. A previously quoted passage
from Ulster implied the possibility of constitutional error when there is
"any risk that [an evidentiary device] ... has caused the... factfinder
to make an erroneous factual determination."38 In Francis v. Frank-
lin,39 the Court considered and rejected the contention that constitu-
tional error occurs only when it is likely that a factfinder's application
of the reasonable doubt standard is adversely affected, finding instead
that error occurs whenever there is a reasonable possibility of adverse
impact on the application of the standard. Franklin involved a chal-
lenge to instructions on a rebuttable presumption of intent.' The
Court found the instructions unconstitutional because a juror might
have interpreted the instructions as shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant on the element of intent, in violation of Winship and
Sandstrom v. Montana.41 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
test of constitutional error for a potentially burden-altering instruction
should be that "it must be at least likely that a juror [gave an unconsti-
tutional interpretation to the instruction] before constitutional error
can be found."42 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held:
36. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
37. Id. at 316-17 (footnotes omitted).
38. 442 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
39. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
40. The jury was instructed that "[tihe acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are
presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted," and "[a]
person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted." Id. at 309.
41. Id. at 325 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
42. Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting; emphasis in original).
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[T]he dissent's proposed standard is irreconcilable with bedrock due
process principles.... [I]t has been settled law since Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), that when there exists a reasonable possibil-
ity that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of the law
in reaching a guilty verdict, that verdict must be set aside.... The
dissent's proposed alternative cannot be squared with this principle;
notwithstanding a substantial doubt as to whether the jury decided that
the State proved intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the dissent would
uphold this conviction based on an impressionistic and intuitive judg-
ment that it was more likely that the jury understood the charge in a
constitutional manner than in an unconstitutional manner.
4 3
Winship principles have thus established a new component of proce-
dural due process. They have constitutionalized a demand for reason-
able certainty about the reliability of a criminal conviction. That
constitutional demand applies to the factfinder's de facto application
of the reasonable doubt standard as well as to the form of the court's
directions to the jury. It requires the allocation of the major risks of
erroneous factfinding to the government. Moreover, it prohibits pro-
cedures that foster any reasonable possibility of factfinder departure
from a rational application of the reasonable doubt standard in an
individual case.
However, the Court has not yet satisfactorily explained the relation-
ship between this new doctrine and procedures for the admission of
evidence. This doctrine must apply to rules governing the admission
of evidence that jeopardizes the reliability of the decisionmaking pro-
cess in criminal trials.
B. Constitutional Reliability Demands for the Admission of
Evidence Against an Accused
L The Absence of Winship-Based Doctrine for the Admission of
Reliability-Threatening Evidence
The Supreme Court's most extensive development of Winship doc-
trine has concerned jury instructions on presumptions and inferences,
and the allocations of burdens of persuasion in criminal proceedings.
As discussed in the preceding section, without exception in these cases
the Court has been intolerant of procedural devices that jeopardize a
factfinder's rational application of the standard to its determination of
guilt or innocence. However, none of the Court's Winship-based deci-
sions has decisively determined how Winship principles apply to prein-
43. Id at 323 n.8 (citations omitted; initial emphasis added).
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struction rulings on the admissibility of incremental items of evidence
in the government's proof.'
The reason for this omission may be traceable to dictum in Lego v.
Twomey. 45 There the Court rejected the contention that Winship
demanded that the voluntariness of a confession be judged by the rea-
sonable doubt standard. The rejection was premised on the fact that
"the purpose that a voluntariness hearing is designed to serve has
nothing whatever to do with improving the reliability of jury ver-
dicts."' 46 However, the Court stated further:
Our decision in Winship was not concerned with standards for determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence.... Winship went no further than to
confirm the fundamental right that protects "the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.",47
The Court's broad statement that "Winship was not concerned with
standards for determining the admissibility of evidence" is correct
when limited to evidence, like the confession at issue in Lego, that does
44. Dictum in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), concerns this question, as discussed in
the following text. The decision in Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), taken
literally, would describe the constitutional test for evidence rules as well as instructional devices.
In Ulster, the Court was speaking of "evidentiary devices" in the context of presumptions and
inferences, but the Court's explication of the constitutional test was not limited to use for
presumptions and inferences; instead it was said to be the "ultimate test of any device's
constitutional validity." Id. at 156 (emphasis added). If by "device" the Court meant any
procedure designed to manage or influence a jury's fact determination or deliberation process,
then the Ulster test clearly would include -rules governing the admissibility of evidence as well as
those telling ajury what use it should make of the evidence admitted. Indeed, for purposes of the
Ulster test there is little reason to distinguish a "device," such as a presumption or inference, and
a court-administered procedure governing the admission of evidence, such as Rule 403. Both
involve court-supervised influences on the jury's fact determination and deliberation process,
both directly and predominantly concern the interest in the reliability of the jury's decision, and
each addresses similar risks of adverse influence on the jury's application of the reasonable doubt
standard. Compare infra notes 93-148 and accompanying text (discussion of reliability impacts
of unfairly prejudicial evidence) with Allen, supra note 27, at 348-54 (finding "judicial
comment"-presumptions, inferences, and instructions-essentially a form of presenting
evidence to a jury, raising Winship concerns to the extent the comment may induce an inaccurate
result).
Federal appellate courts occasionally have considered due process-based challenges to the
admission of potentially prejudicial uncharged misconduct evidence. However, none has
considered a Winship-based argument; instead, these courts have applied a more general
"fundamental fairness" analysis that fails to account for the particular constitutional interests
guaranteed by Winship. See, e.g., Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1981); Hills v.
Henderson, 529 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976); Manning v. Rose, 507
F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974).
45. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
46. Id. at 486.
47. Id. (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
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not threaten the reliability of a jury verdict. The reasonable doubt
standard serves as a required measure of the totality of the govern-
ment's evidence of guilt, not as a protection against bits of proof which
may not be convincing evidence of guilt when viewed in isolation.
Accordingly, when courts talk about a "burden" in the context of the
admissibility of an individual item of proof, usually they are discussing
the question whether the factfinder properly could choose to give
incremental weight to the evidence. In this context admission of the
evidence, even when there is substantial room for doubt about the
weight it deserves, will not jeopardize the required certainty about a
defendant's guilt because we can expect that the factfinder will ration-
ally apply the reasonable doubt standard to the proof as a whole. For
example, a jury considering a confession like that in Lego might har-
bor more than a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the confes-
sion if there is substantial evidence that it was coerced. If the
confession were the only evidence of the defendant's guilt we could
trust that the jury would acquit the defendant, absent reason to believe
the jury would act irrationally. And if there was other evidence that
resolved the doubt about the reliability of the confession, a rational
jury could, consistently with the reasonable doubt standard, convict.
The conviction would be based in part on the evidence of the confes-
sion, but the admission of that evidence would not have threatened
expectations about the reliability of the conviction, even though the
confession was unreliable proof of guilt standing alone.4 8 Thus, where
there is no risk that admission of an incremental item of proof will
threaten the jury's rational application of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard to the proof as a whole, there are simply no Winship issues raised
by the admission of the evidence.49 On its facts, Lego is therefore con-
48. See, eg., Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2778-79 (1987). The court stated:
We have traditionally required that [admissibility determinations that hinge on preliminary
factual questions] be established by a preponderance of proof. Evidence is placed before the
jury when it satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary Rules, which embody
certain legal and policy determinations. The inquiry made by a court concerned with these
matters is not whether the proponent of the evidence wins or loses his case on the merits, but
whether the evidentiary Rules have been satisfied. Thus, the evidentiary standard is
unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive issues, be it a criminal case or a civil
case.
(Citations omitted).
49. No such challenge was involved in Lego. As the Court noted in that case:
A high standard of proof is necessary ... to ensure against unjust convictions by giving
substance to the presumption of innocence .... A guilty verdict is not rendered less reliable
or less consonant with Winship simply because the admissibility of a confession is
determined by a less stringent standard [than reasonable doubt]. [Petitioner] does not
challenge the constitutionality of the standard by which the jury was instructed to decide his
guilt or innocence; nor does he question the sufficiency of the evidence that reached the jury
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sistent with Winship. Lego does not, however, resolve the applicability
of Winship to procedures for the admission of evidence that threatens
the reliability of the decisionmaking process.50
Another explanation for the absence of Winship-based analysis of
evidentiary issues may be found in the chronology of the development
of Winship doctrine and of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rules
took effect in 1975, five years after Winship. It is possible that this
relatively recent adoption of the rules has imbued them with a pre-
sumption of current validity that has deflected serious constitutional
criticism.
In fact, any presumption of the constitutional validity of Rule 403
on that basis would be misplaced. Prior to the 1975 decision in Mulla-
ney v. Wilbur, the reasonable doubt standard could be viewed as
divorced from the workings of trials apart from the instructions given
a jury. 1 The Mullaney decision contained the first indication from the
Court that the constitutionally demanded reasonable doubt standard
applies to a factfinder's substantive application of the standard as well
as a court's duties of instruction. As has been noted, express indica-
tion that Winship applies to the substantive application of the standard
did not come until Jackson v. Virginia,52 four years later. Even now,
nineteen years after Winship, the development of Winship doctrine is
far from complete. The Federal Rules of Evidence were drafted, con-
sidered, and enacted before the first of these major doctrinal develop-
ments had occurred, and thus it should not be surprising if Rule 403
to satisfy the proper standard of proof... Winship is inapplicable because the purpose of a
voluntariness hearing is not to implement the presumption of innocence.
404 U.S. at 486-87 (citation and footnote omitted).
50. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall in dissent in Lego, did not
dispute the majority's holding that the voluntariness issue did not involve Winship reliability
guarantees. Instead, Justice Brennan's dissent was premised on a belief that the voluntariness
question should be decided on a reasonable doubt standard to safeguard a separate right to be
free from conviction based on an involuntary confession:
If we permit the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession
was voluntary, then ... we must be prepared to justify the view that it is no more serious in
general to admit involuntary confessions than it is to exclude voluntary confessions.... If
we are to provide "concrete substance" for the command of the Fifth Amendment that no
person shall be compelled to condemn himself, we must insist, as we do at the trial of guilt
or innocence, that the prosecution prove that the defendant's confession was voluntary
beyond a reasonable doubt.
404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). For discussion of Supreme Court
decisions that do involve the constitutional requirements for admission of reliability-threatening
evidence, see infra notes 75-88 (constitutional standards for admission of hearsay evidence).
51. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text (discussion of Winship and Mullaney
decisions).
52. 443 U.S. 307 (1979); see supra discussion accompanying notes 36-37.
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fails to reflect the new constitutional doctrine still being developed by
the Court in this area.
2. The Constitutionality of the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence
Against a Criminal Defendant: Existing Precedent
Since Rule 403 was enacted the Supreme Court has addressed its
application in a criminal case but once. In United States v. Abel5 3 the
Court rejected a defendant's challenge to the admission of evidence,
offered to impeach a defense witness for bias, that the defendant and
the witness were members of a secret prison organization whose tenets
included a requirement that members commit perjury, steal, and com-
mit murder on behalf of other members. However, the defendant did
not base his challenge to the evidence on constitutional grounds, but
argued instead that admission of the evidence was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion under Rule 403 "because the prejudicial effect of the
contested evidence outweighed its probative value."54 The Court
noted the broad discretion accorded trial court rulings on the admissi-
bility of evidence, the powerful force of the evidence in question on the
issue of bias, and the precautions taken by the trial court to minimize
any derivative prejudice to the defendant.5 The Court found that
"[t]hese precautions did not prevent all prejudice to [the defendant]
from [the evidence], but they did, in our opinion, ensure that the
admission of this highly probative evidence did not unduly prejudice
[him]."56 Accordingly, it found that the admission of the evidence
was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.17
The Supreme Court's decision in Abel cannot be regarded as sup-
portive of the constitutionality of the Rule 403 balancing test because
the defendant in that case did not challenge the constitutionality of the
rule. Moreover, the Court's ambiguous holding that the "highly pro-
bative" evidence did not "unduly" prejudice the defendant would be
consistent with the rule proposed in Part IV of this Article, which
demands a far greater showing of justification for admission of the
evidence than is now required by Rule 403.
The first, and perhaps only, Supreme Court consideration of a chal-
lenge on constitutional grounds to the admission of potentially preju-
dicial evidence appears to have been in Lisenba v. California.58 There
53. 469 U.S. 45 (198.4).
54. Id. at 53.
55. Id. at 54.
56. Id. at 54-55 (emphasis original).
57. Id. at 55.
58. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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the defendant complained, on fourteenth amendment due process
grounds, about the admission of evidence of his prior uncharged
wrongs and other allegedly inflammatory evidence. The defendant
had been convicted on a state charge for the murder of his wife by
drowning, with the apparent motive of collecting insurance proceeds
on her life, after an abortive attempt to kill her by binding her and
subjecting her to rattlesnake bites. The challenged evidence consisted
of proof of the death of a former wife by drowning following a similar
abortive murder attempt, accompanied by the defendant's collection of
insurance proceeds on the former wife's life, and the introduction at
trial of two rattlesnakes identified as having been sold to the defend-
ant's alleged accomplice.
The Court's consideration and rejection of these challenges was cur-
sory. Without citation of authority, the Court rejected the challenge
to the evidence of the former wife's death, stating only that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment leaves [the State] free to adopt a rule of rele-
vance which the court below holds was applied here in accordance
with the State's law."59 Similarly, the Court cited no authority for its
denial of the challenge to the admission of the snakes:
We do not sit to review state court action on questions of the propriety
of the trial judge's action in the admission of evidence. We cannot hold,
as petitioner urges, that the introduction and identification of the snakes
so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law. The
fact that evidence admitted as relevant by a court is shocking to the
sensibilities of those in the courtroom cannot, for that reason alone,
render its reception a violation of due process.6°
Seven years after Lisenba, the Supreme Court decided Michelson v.
United States.61 In Michelson the defendant challenged the prosecu-
tor's questioning of defendant's character witnesses about their knowl-
edge of an arrest of the defendant twenty-seven years earlier, pursuant
to the generally accepted common law rule permitting such question-
ing of reputation witnesses. Arguably, Michelson did not purport to
resolve a constitutional issue; the majority never addressed the issues
in constitutional terms and instead appears to have treated the issue as
directed to the Court's supervisory powers over federal criminal tri-
als. 62 However, two dissenters would have found a due process viola-
59. Id. at 227-28.
60. Id. at 228-29.
61. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
62. Consider, for example, the final paragraph of the majority opinion:
The present suggestion is that we adopt for all federal courts a new rule as to cross-
examination about prior arrest, adhered to by the courts of only one state and rejected
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tion under the circumstances,63 which suggests that the majority may
have considered and rejected such a challenge.
But even if the Michelson majority was rejecting a constitutional
challenge to the evidence, its conclusion was clearly grounded on the
rationale that under the circumstances any prejudice was invited by,
and in the control of, the defendant. The Court acknowledged the
probable inadequacy of limiting instructions to avoid jury misuse of
the evidence of the defendant's arrest:
We do not overlook or minimize the consideration that "the jury almost
surely cannot comprehend the Judge's limiting instructions," which dis-
turbed the Court of Appeals. The refinements of the evidentiary rules
on this subject are such that even lawyers and judges, after study and
reflection, often are confused, and surely jurors in the hurried and unfa-
miliar movement of a trial must find them almost unintelligible. 64
But, the Court found:
[I]n cases such as the one before us, the law foreclosed this whole con-
founding line of inquiry, unless defendant thought the net advantage
from opening it up would be with him. Given this option, we think
defendants in general and this defendant in particular have no valid
complaint at the latitude which existing law allows to the prosecution to
meet by cross-examination an issue voluntarily tendered by the
defense.65
Finally, in Spencer v. Texas 66 the Court rejected a general due pro-
cess challenge to a Texas recidivist procedure in which the jury trying
the issue of guilt was presented with evidence of the prior convictions
supporting the recidivism charge, under instructions to disregard that
evidence on the issue of guilt. The Court began its constitutional anal-
ysis by reviewing the variety of evidence rules permitting the use of
evidence of prior convictions despite a potential for prejudice. 67 "In
all these situations," the Court said, "the jury learns of prior crimes
elsewhere. The confusion and error it would engender would seem too heavy a price to pay
for an almost imperceptible logical improvement, if any, in a system which is justified, if at
all, by accumulated judicial experience rather than abstract logic.
Id at 486-87 (footnote omitted).
63. In his dissent, Justice Rutledge stated:
I think [the evidence of the prior conviction] was put in evidence in this case, not to call in
question the witness' standard of opinion but, by the very question, to give room for play of
the jury's unguarded conjecture and prejudice. This is neither fair play nor due process. It
is a perversion of the criminal process as we know it.
Id. at 495 (Rutiedge, J., joined by Murphy, J., dissenting; emphasis original).
64. Id at 484-85.
65. I.d at 485.
66. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
67. Id. at 560-61.
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committed by the defendant, but the conceded possibility of prejudice
is believed to be outweighed by the validity of the State's purpose in
permitting introduction of the evidence.", 68
Ultimately, however, the Court based its decision on federalism con-
cerns and the defendant's reliance on a generalized due process chal-
lenge rather than on a specific constitutional right:
[I]t has never been thought that [cases acknowledging a due process
right to fundamental fairness in criminal trials] establish this Court as a
rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal proce-
dure. And none of the specific provisions of the Constitution ordains
this Court with such authority. In the face of the legitimate state pur-
pose and the long-standing and widespread use that attend the proce-
dure under attack here, we find it impossible to say that because of the
possibility of some collateral prejudice the Texas procedure is rendered
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause as it has been interpreted
and applied in our past cases....
... In the procedures before us .. .no specific federal right ... is
involved; reliance is placed solely on a general "fairness" approach. In
this area the Court has always moved with caution before striking down
state procedures. 69
This sparse precedent can be of little weight in a constitutional anal-
ysis of Rule 403's operation in criminal trials. The naked conclusions
advanced in Lisenba express a federalism concern but are devoid of
other reasoning. Michelson did not purport to be based on constitu-
tional grounds, and moreover was premised on the defendant's control
over the occurrence of prejudice, control that is missing for most
issues under Rule 403. Of the three decisions, Spencer alone addressed
the constitutional aspects of prejudicial evidence, but there are several
reasons Spencer does not control the constitutionality of Rule 403.
First, Spencer was decided in 1967, three years before the Court's
decision in Winship. The Court's decision in Spencer was premised in
part on the generality of the defendants' challenge to the "fundamen-
tal fairness" of the procedure. However, a Winship-based challenge to
a prejudicial procedure can no longer be said to be based solely on a
general fairness approach. Winship's constitutionalization of the rea-
sonable doubt standard has added a new, specific, and fundamental
interest in reliability to the constitutional equation. The Spencer
Court's identification of a defendant's interest as one in the "funda-
mental fairness" of the proceedings, to be balanced against the "valid-
68. Id. at 561.
69. Id. at 564-65.
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ity of the State's purpose in permitting introduction of the evidence"-
an interest in avoiding multiple proceedings 0 would not address a
challenge to Rule 403 based on its impact on the Winship guarantee of
the reliability of convictions.
In addition, to the extent Spencer might be viewed as approving, in
dictum, the various rules permitting the use of prejudicial evidence,
that approval must be taken in the context of the Court's assumption
that the State's valid interest in the admission of the evidence would
outweigh the prejudice to the defendant from its use.71 That was the
accepted balancing test prior to the adoption of Rule 403. Rule 403
has, however, reversed that balance.72
Moreover, the federalism concerns that were decisive in Spencer are
missing in an analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Although
acceptance of a Winship-based challenge to the constitutionality of the
rule would cast serious doubt on the validity of any similar reliability-
threatening state procedure, it is at least arguable that the Spencer
concerns would support some measure of greater deference to state
procedures than the Constitution would permit in the Court's review
of the validity of a federal procedure.73 That issue aside, the Spencer
Court's repeated and decisive emphasis on federalism concerns pre-
cludes any controlling force for the decision in a constitutional analy-
sis of Rule 403. 74
The Court in none of these decisions considered a challenge to prej-
udicial evidence founded on the constitutional demand for reliability
given explicit recognition in Winship, nor did it recognize and resolve
70. Id. at 561.
71. See supra text accompanying note 68 (quoting Spencer).
72. See infra note 132 (discussion of effect of Rule 403 on common law test).
73. The possible application of the arguments here to state procedures is a matter beyond the
scope of this Article. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that federalism plays a part in
Winship analysis. For example, the Court has recognized that the states have considerable
latitude with respect to the definition of the elements of a crime for Winship purposes. See, eg.,
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state may constitutionally place burden of proof of self-
defense on defendant); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (state may constitutionally
place burden of proving absence of malice on defendant). On the other hand, the Court has
shown no apparent deference to state interests where a state procedure has threatened the proper
application of the reasonable doubt standard to a state's chosen elements. See, eg., supra notes
39-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Franklin).
74. The Court's approach to Spencer was criticized in a contemporary survey as "almost
archaic" and "hardly consistent with the Court's other ... due process decisions." The Supreme
Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 210, 211 (1967) (footnote omitted). Spencer was
reaffirmed in a post-Winship decision, Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983). There, Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion reemphasized the federalism concerns as "central to our decision
[in Spencer]." Id at 438 n.6. Four dissenting Justices believed "the only premises that even
arguably support the holding in Spencer are no longer valid." Id at 457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the competing reliability concerns implicated by the admission of pro-
bative but prejudicial evidence. Thus, there is no Supreme Court deci-
sion that unambiguously delineates the boundaries of constitutionally
acceptable allocations of the risks of error from the admission of preju-
dicial evidence, in light of Winship's new emphasis on reliability. An
indication of those boundaries can be found in the Court's Winship-
based decisions which concern the validity of burden of proof-shifting
presumptions and inferences. Additional guidance can be derived
from the constitutional doctrine established by the Court for infringe-
ments on a criminal defendant's ability to cross-examine, a doctrine
developed in response to concern about the impacts of hearsay on the
reliability of the decisionmaking process.
3. Constitutional Reliability Demands for the Admission
of Hearsay Evidence
An analogue of the constitutional issues raised by Rule 403 is found
in the Supreme Court's decisions on the constitutionality of the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence against criminal defendants. Although the
challenge to Rule 403 presented here is based on Winship's fifth
amendment due process guarantees, whereas those raised by hearsay
evidence derive from the sixth amendment confrontation right, the
two lines of inquiry involve identical interests and present the issues in
an analogous setting. This overlap is constitutional as well; the con-
frontation right is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.75
At least since 1895, the Supreme Court has recognized that reliabil-
ity concerns are the core of the confrontation clause.7 6 The right "to
confront and to cross-examine witnesses," the Court has held, "is pri-
marily a functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials."'77
Moreover, the Court has recognized that the admission of out-of-court
statements against a criminal defendant demands a balancing of these
reliability concerns against a competing societal interest in reliable
factfinding that may be served by the admission of the statements. 8
75. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); see also Westen, The Future of Confrontation.
77 MICH. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1979) (adopting the position advanced by Justice Harlan in a
concurring opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-89 (1970), that the confrontation
clause states only a preference for the live testimony of a witness when available, and when the
witness is not available the admissibility of the witness's hearsay declarations is governed by the
due process clause).
76. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
77. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986).
78. See Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987). The Court in Bourjaily described
its past efforts at confrontation clause analysis in distinctly balancing terms:
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Since Dutton v. Evans,79 this balancing approach has required a
demonstration of "indicia of reliability" for out-of-court statements as
a condition of their acceptability under the confrontation clause.80
More recent decisions have found that requirement presumptively sat-
isfied by the compliance of hearsay evidence with the requirements of
a "firmly rooted hearsay exception.""1 However, for hearsay not
within such an exception the Court has demanded "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness,"82 which must provide reliability pro-
tections equivalent to those that normally would be provided by cross-
examination. 3 This test does not lend itself to precise correlation with
the balancing test of Rule 403, but at the least the hearsay test
expresses a constitutional presumption against the admission of the
evidence, absent a showing of predominant reliability or compliance
with an established hearsay exception that ensures reliability.
This constitutional presumption disfavors the use of hearsay even
though the reliability risks from "ordinary" hearsay are tempered by
inherent protections against an inaccurate or irrational use of the evi-
[W]e have attempted to harmonize the goal of the [Confrontation] Clause-placing limits on
the kind of evidence that may be received against a defendant-with a societal interest in
accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements. To
accommodate these competing interests, the Court has, as a general matter only, required
the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarant and the "indicia of
reliability" surrounding the out-of-court declaration.
Id at 2782 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)).
79. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality decision).
80. Id. at 89.
81. See, e.g., Boudaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782-83 (hearsay that falls within firmly rooted hearsay
exception requires no independent inquiry into its reliability (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980))).
82. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence fails within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." (footnote omitted)).
83. See id The Roberts Court stated:
Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only
hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that "there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule ...... The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability"
requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
"substance of the constitutional protection." This reflects the truism that "hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values," and "stem
from the same roots."
Id. at 65-66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970), California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970), Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934), and Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
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dence by a factfinder. Although a defendant is denied the ability to test
the reliability of hearsay by cross-examination, the defendant can
point to that inability, the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement, and any unreasonable or contradictory inferences from
the statement as reasons to doubt the statement's reliability; moreover,
the statement will be evaluated by a factfinder who normally can be
expected to make a rational application of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard to the proof.
It will be shown in Part III that those inherent protections are miss-
ing for unfairly prejudicial evidence and that "unfair prejudice" under
Rule 403 is a measure of the risks that evidence may induce inaccurate
or irrational factfinding, or factfinder departure from faithful applica-
tion of the reasonable doubt standard. Those risks are parallel to the
reliability risks presented by evidence of uncross-examined accomplice
confessions. The Court's confrontation clause doctrine for that kind
of evidence thus presents a closer analogy than "ordinary" hearsay to
the constitutional demands for the treatment of unfairly prejudicial
evidence.
The Court has held that evidence of an uncross-examined accom-
plice confession that incriminates a defendant "is so 'inevitably sus-
pect' and 'devastating' that the ordinarily sound assumption that a
jury will be able to follow faithfully its instructions [cannot] be
applied," 84 generating the "concern that the admission of this type of
evidence will distort the truthfinding process." 85 Thus, in Bruton v.
United States86 the admission of evidence of an accomplice confession
was held to violate the defendant's confrontation right even though
the jury had been instructed to disregard the confession as evidence
against the defendant. In Lee v. Illinois87 the Court addressed the
demonstration of reliability constitutionally required for such evidence
and held that there would need to "exist sufficient 'indicia of reliabil-
ity'.., to overcome [a] weighty presumption against the admission of
such uncross-examined evidence."88
84. Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 136 (1968)).
85. Id.
86. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
87. 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
88. Id. at 2065 (emphasis added).
312
Vol. 64:289, 1989
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases
C. Summary: Constitutional Reliability Demands for the Admission
of Evidence in Criminal Cases
A verdict of guilt must be more than a probably accurate recon-
struction of historical events; it must inspire confidence that it reflects
historical reality with the "utmost certainty" of which Winship
spoke.8 9 That historical reality is, however, unknowable, and our con-
fidence in the "accuracy" of a verdict of guilt ultimately must turn on
the extent to which the trial procedure permitted error in the verdict.90
The constitutional measure of a procedure that affects the reliability of
outcomes in criminal cases must be whether the procedure jeopardizes
reasonable certitude that an innocent person has not been convicted.
A procedure that jeopardizes that certitude is unconstitutional even if
it might also enhance the possibility of obtaining an accurate
conviction.91
89. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
90. This Article uses the term "accuracy" as a measure of the correctness of judicial
determinations, like other writing on the topic. See, eg., infra notes 103-04 and accompanying
text (discussion of Professor Victor Gold's description of the connection between unfair prejudice
and "accurate" factfinding); infra note 91 (Supreme Court's similar use of the term in Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)); infra note 222 (Justice Harlan's similar use in concurring
opinion in inship). However, such uses of "accuracy" may generate semantic disagreement.
Professor Ronald Allen has criticized "accuracy" as a meaningless measure of results in judicial
determinations because "'[a]ccuracy' . . . is a measure of decisionmaking in conditions of
certainty where reality is known," and "[d]ecisiommaking in the criminal justice system is
decisionmaking in uncertainty." Allen, Rationality and Accuracy in the Criminal Process" A
Discordant Note on the Harmonizing of the Justice's Views on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1147, 1152 (1983); see also infra note 154 (discussing
Professor Weissenberger's criticism of "accuracy" as a useful measure of the validity of evidence
rules). Professor Allen prefers the term "rationality" as a measure of judicial decisionmaking,
which he describes as "the correlation of a particular process or aggregate outcome with the
process or outcome that we think would be provided by well-informed, disinterested
decisionmakers." Allen, supra, at 1152 (footnote omitted).
As used in this Article, the "accuracy" of a judicial decision is the justifiable confidence that
can be placed in the decision as a prediction of an unknowable, but nonetheless existent, reality.
This kind of confidence in probable correctness is what standards of proof are about. If the
reader understands that such references are meant to address expectations of correctness while
acknowledging their ultimate uncertainty, the term should produce no semantic confusion.
91. There is a natural tendency to regard the government's interest in obtaining a conviction
as one that competes with a defendant's interest in avoiding an inaccurate conviction. In this
view, the balancing challenge presented by probative but unfairly prejudicial evidence involves a
conflict of interests. However, this view fails to recognize the extent to which the interests of the
government and the defendant are shared. The Court stated in Ake v. Oklahoma:
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's
life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned
by this Court over the years to 'diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a
testament to that concern....
. . . The State's interest in prevailing at trial-unlike that of a private litigant-is
necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases.
Washington Law Review
That constitutional test invites confusion about the demonstration
of reliability that should be required for incremental items of proof in
the government's case in criminal trials. When the only risk of unreli-
ability presented by evidence is the risk that, considered in isolation,
the evidence is less than convincing proof of guilt, the risk must be
judged against the fact that the outcome will reflect the factfinder's
application of a highly demanding measure of certainty to its ultimate
evaluation of the totality of the proof. Thus, for unexceptional evi-
dence risks of unreliability are accommodated by the expectations that
factfinder rationality and the reasonable doubt standard will safeguard
against erroneous convictions. Accordingly, the appropriate test for
admissibility of an incremental piece of proof ordinarily is whether the
proof offers the possibility of assisting toward a more reliable recon-
struction of events. That question is satisfactorily answered by a trial
court's determination that the evidence has probative value.92
This general principle does not, however, apply to evidence that
threatens the normal expectation of rational and accurate decision-
making or jeopardizes trust in the factfinder's faithful application of
the standard of proof. For such evidence, the unreliability of these
safeguards and the resulting threat to the integrity of the factfinding
process demand special scrutiny of the potential impact of the evi-
dence on the outcome-scrutiny found, for nonhearsay evidence, in
the Rule 403 balancing test. The validity of that balancing test in
criminal cases therefore will depend on the extent to which it provides
safeguards against an erroneous conviction comparable to those pro-
vided by the reasonable doubt standard in circumstances where the
integrity of the decisionmaking process can be presumed.
Thus, also unlike a private litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in
maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.
470 U.S. at 68, 78-79 (1985); see also Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due
Process in Criminal Cases.' A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969) (commenting on
constitutional concerns raised by the operation of presumptions in criminal cases). The authors
emphasized:
By speaking in comparative terms, the court should not allow itself to stray into a balancing
process involving elements which should not be balanced. To allow the government's inter-
est to control the acceptable level of imprecision occasioned by the presumption is to lose
sight of the meaning of that interest. The interest of the government is in proving that guilty
persons are guilty; its interest is not simply in winning cases. The governmental interest in
acquitting the innocent cannot be subordinated to its interest in convicting the guilty.
Id. at 186.
92. See supra note 48 (quoting Supreme Court's description of process for determining
admission questions).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 403
A. Rule 403 as a Procedural Control on the Reliability of
Decisionmaking
1. Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice as Reliability Concerns
Although the Rule 403 balancing test necessarily presupposes an
ability to meaningfully compare and to execute a rational balancing of
probative value and the exclusion-justifying dangers, many courts and
commentators may not perceive a shared theoretical basis by which
such comparisons can be made.93
The concept of "probative value" in Rule 403 addresses the concern
for reliability in factfinding. Although commentators have differed as
to how the probative value of evidence should be assessed,94 there is no
dispute that ultimately it is a measure of the extent to which evidence
may contribute to a more accurate factual determination. Indeed,
there is a common tendency to think of the admission of probative
evidence as always enhancing accurate factfinding, and its exclusion as
invariably detracting from accuracy.95 The relationship between
unfair prejudice and this concern for accuracy in factfinding is less
obvious, inviting the conclusion that Rule 403 requires a balancing of
incomparables. For example, Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth Gra-
ham have contended that the balancing test of Rule 403 "requires one
to balance incommensurable factors. It is like weighing so many
pounds against so many feet since the units are measuring different
qualities."96 Similarly, Edward Imwinkelried has justified the admis-
sion-presumptive bias of Rule 403 in part because "[e]ven if the judge
could objectively gauge either probative value or [prejudicial] danger,
the factors themselves could not be so measured against each other.
Striking a balance between such factors is a 'procrustean task,' and
judges will inevitably differ in the manner in which they balance the
factors."97
93. See Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11, at 60-63 (describing failure of courts and
commentators to rationally compare probative value and prejudice for balancing purposes).
94. See infra note 112 (discussing proper measurement of probative value and prejudice).
95. See, eg., I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 1 402[01], at 402-8 ("The
fundamental condition for enhancing the possibility of accurate fact finding is that as much
relevant information as possible be placed before the trier." (footnote omitted)).
96. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5214, at 266 n.17.
97. Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 1486-87 (quoting Comment, Evidence-Other Crimes-
Balancing Relevance and Need Against Unfair Prejudice to Determine the Admissibility of Other
Unexplained Deaths as Proof of the Corpus Delicti and the Perpetrator's Identity: United States v.
Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), 6 RuT.-CAM. L.L 173, 177 (1974) (footnotes omitted)).
Such claims of incomparability should be distinguished from the valid recognition that
probative value and prejudice are not inherently reciprocal. See, eg., Note, Other Crimes
Washington Law Review
If Rule 403 required a balancing of incomparables it would provide
an irrational basis for decisions on the admissibility of evidence. How-
ever, Victor Gold has convincingly refuted that idea in an article
which demonstrates that a shared theoretical basis for evaluating the
several factors addressed by the rule does exist and that the common
ground for the evaluation and balancing of probative value and unfair
prejudice is the interest in reliable factfinding.98 In fact, Professor
Gold's analysis demonstrates that the three unfairly prejudicial dan-
gers addressed by the rule can be meaningfully balanced against pro-
bative value only when evaluated in terms of their impact on the
reliability of factfinding.
As Gold notes:
Courts and commentators have assumed that [probative value and the
danger of unfair prejudice] refer to two distinct characteristics of evi-
dence that should be evaluated in two very different ways .... [T]hese
assumptions are unsupported by the... principles underlying Rule 403.
Moreover, such assumptions provide no apparent basis for comparing
unfair prejudice and probative value, making the required weighing of
the two values a contest between apples and oranges in which it is
impossible to pick a winner.99
Gold has examined the policies underlying Rule 403, finding the
rule "like a statement of principle: concern for truth and fairness may
override specific rules of admissibility."'" Analyzing "truth" and
"fairness" in the context of decisions on the admission of evidence at
trial, he concludes that "both truth and fairness share a similar mean-
ing[:] . . . rendition of verdicts by an unbiased jury based upon the
logical implications of the evidence." ' ' Thus, he finds, "the policies
of fairness and accuracy underlying Rule 403 can be promoted if the
court exercises its power to exclude evidence by considering the effect
of evidence on the reliability of the jury's inferential processes."10 2
In Gold's view, "[i]f probative value refers to the capacity of evi-
dence to produce a judgment based on accurate factfinding, unfair
Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 773 (1961) ("There is no
necessary correlation between prejudicial impact and probative worth. Prior sexual offenses and
other heinous crimes can be extremely damning, even though their logical relation to the crime
charged may be tenuous." (footnote omitted)).
98. Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11. That article is in part a development of ideas
advanced by Professor Gold in an earlier article, Gold, Observations, supra note 11.
99. Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11, at 73 (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 66.
101. Id. at 67.
102. Id. at 72.
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prejudice must refer to the capacity of evidence to subvert this objec-
tive."1 3 He concludes that
[B]oth probative value and unfair prejudice should be interpreted as
referring to the effect of evidence on the jury's inferential processes.
Under this interpretation, evidence has probative value if it enhances the
accuracy ofjury factfinding. Accurate factfinding is enhanced when evi-
dence logically increases the certainty of a fact in issue and the jury
correctly perceives both the fact affected, and the extent to which its
certainty is logically established. On the other hand, evidence is unfairly
prejudicial when it detracts from the accuracy of factfinding by inducing
the jury to commit an inferential error. Inferential errors occur when
the jury perceives evidence to be logically probative of a fact when it is
not, perceives the evidence to be more probative of a fact than it logi-
cally is, or bases its decision on improper bias. This interpretation
makes the language of Rule 403 consistent with its underlying policies
and provides a common theoretical basis for comparing probative value
with unfair prejudice.1°4
As Gold acknowledges, "inferential errors" are not the only reliabil-
ity-impairing concerns addressed in Rule 403; the potential appeal of
evidence to emotion can also give rise to unfair prejudice. 105 In addi-
103. Id. at 79.
104. Id. at 73 (footnotes omitted).
105. /ML at 79. However, Professor Gold contends that even emotion-based prejudice
ultimately derives its prejudicial impact from "inferential errors" of reasoning, rather than from
the emotion itself. He notes, for example:
When a jury concludes that the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries suggests defendant must
have been negligent, the evidence of damage has been prejudicial. Prejudice arises not
because of the jury's emotional reaction to the evidence, but because the evidence has
induced an inferential error.... The prejudicial impact of photographs of a victim's gory
remains derives from the potential of such vivid evidence to dominate the minds of jurors.
The fact that such evidence evokes an emotional reaction from the jury does not necessarily
make it prejudicial. There may be nothing wrong with shocking a jury with the
repulsiveness of a wound, provided the impression created by the evidence is commensurate
with its objective worth.
Id at 82 (footnote omitted). Gold notes the findings of Kalven and Zeisel, that
[J]uries... unconsciously yield to emotion when the meaning of the evidence or the proper
inferences to be drawn therefrom are doubtful. Juries then begin unconsciously to rel on
emotion to resolve their doubts, enabling them to draw an inference or reach a verdict. In
this way emotion liberates the jury from the purely logical implications of the evidence.
Id. at 83 (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-65 (1966)). Gold
concludes:
[This hypothesis] suggests that it is not emotion per se that jeopardizes the reliability of the
factfinding process. Rather, juries turn to emotion as a basis for decisionmaking only after
that process has already been confused or obscured. The danger of unfair prejudice is cre-
ated by that aspect of evidence that confuses or obscures, such as the vividness of grisly
photos or the similarity of prior crimes, not by the emotions that such evidence generates.
Id. at 83.
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tion, evidence can threaten the integrity of the decisionmaking process
itself. For example, it can induce jurors to alter their calculus of the
guilt-determination standard in a manner adverse to the defendant, 1°6
mislead them as to the legitimate issues in the case,10 7 or confuse them
in a way that substantially interferes with their ability to make a
rational decision. 10
8
Professor Gold's analysis presents a useful basis for evaluating the
balancing test of Rule 403, because it demonstrates that probative
value and prejudice are not "apples and oranges" but rather "apples
and anti-apples," positive and negative contributors to the search for
reliability in factfinding. This analysis provides an equivalent basis by
which the factors addressed in the rule can be judged.109
The drafters of Rule 403 recognized that a contextual assessment of
unfair prejudice is required and that this assessment should be made in
106. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussion of impacts of uncharged
misconduct evidence on alterations of guilt-determination standard); see also 22 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 4, § 5215, at 278 ("[T]he Wigmorean definition of 'prejudice' is
reminiscent of the test for determining the fitness of jurors to serve. This is hardly coincidental;
one measure of the illegitimacy of a proposed line of proof is the degree to which it will lead the
jurors to depart from the ideal conception of their function as fact-finders.").
107. See, e.g., Professor Graham's definition of the "misleading" danger, in terms that are
clearly reliability-related and just as clearly within Professor Gold's concept of "inferential
errors":
While Rule 403 speaks in terms of both confusion of the issues and misleading of the jury,
the distinction between such terms is unclear in the literature and in the cases .... While of
course a jury confused [by evidence that causes it to lose sight of the main issue] can also be
said to have been misled, it is suggested that the concept of misleading the jury refers
primarily to the possibility of the jury overvaluing the probative value of a particular item of
evidence for any reason other than the emotional reaction associated with unfair prejudice.
M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.1, at 184-85 (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes
omitted).
108. The possible impact of the "confusion" danger on reliability should be obvious, if the
risk of "confusion" is recognized as the risk that the factfinder may lose track of the real issues in
a case and treat peripheral or inconsequential issues as controlling. The two factors, misleading
and confusion, are specifically identified along with unfairprejudice in Rule 403 as "dangers" and
thus are distinguished in kind-but not in treatment-from the time-wasting "considerations" in
Rule 403. Professor Gold recognizes both as threats to reliable factfinding. See Gold, Limiting
Discretion, supra note 11, at 65.
109. Although some commentators have questioned the existence of a logical relationship
between probative value and prejudice, others have recognized the reliability-based relationship
Professor Gold has described. See, e.g., 1 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 402[02],
at 402-11 ("A line of proof directed to one proposition may cause confusion or prejudice
concerning another. A certain type of proof may be inherently lacking in trustworthiness so that
its admission would hamper rather than advance the search for truth."); see also Dolan, supra
note 7, at 226-27; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1032-41 (1977).
The theses of this Article rely on the validity of Professor Gold's observation that probative
value and unfair prejudice are fundamentally reliability-related concepts. The reader who
harbors doubts about the validity of the observation or desires a more extensive explanation is
encouraged to consider Gold's articles in full.
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light of the circumstances of a particular case and after accounting for
any possible reduction of prejudice that can be obtained through the
use of protective measures.' 10 An assessment of probative value also
should be contextual. To the extent other evidence has convincingly
established the fact in question, the incremental probative value of the
evidence in question to prove the same point may be substantially
reduced from what it would have been if viewed in isolation."' In
other words, estimations of both probative value and prejudice should
be contextual predictions of the probable impact of the evidence on the
reliability of decisionmaking." 2
110. The advisory committee's note to Rule 403 clearly contemplates that assessments of
unfair prejudice will be contextual. The committee stated that
Situations in this area call for balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence
against the harm likely to result from its admission.... In reaching a decision whether to
exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.
FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory, committee's note (emphasis added). Other measures may also be
available to reduce prejudice dangers, and appropriately would be considered in a prediction of
likely prejudice. See, eg, infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing advance notice
of the intent to offer evidence, required withholding of the evidence until rebuttal, acceptance of
stipulations, and articulation of theories of admissibility).
111. The advisory committee's note to Rule 403 states that "[tihe availability of other means
of proof may ... be an appropriate factor" to be considered in reaching a decision whether to
exclude on the ground of unfair prejudice. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
In an article applying probability theory to legal relevance questions, Professor Richard
Lempert has also concluded that the relevance of an item of proof on an issue is interdependent
with the relevance of other proof offered on the same issue. See Lempert, supra note 109, at
1042-46.
112. Some courts and commentators have advocated an application of Rule 403 that would
have the trial court measure the probative value of evidence by the maximum logical force it
could justify, while discounting the risk of unfair prejudice by the application of some form of
conservative bias to its measurement. For example, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger have
stated that the usual approach of courts conducting Rule 403 balancing is to "give the evidence
its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value." 1 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 403[03], at 403-47. Stephen Saltzburg and Kenneth
Redden have argued instead that "the proper equation places on one side the maximum
reasonable probative force of the offered evidence... [against] the likely prejudicial impact of the
evidence," because juries are allowed to make all reasonable inferences from the proof, justifying
an allocation of maximum probative force, but "there is no reason to assume that they will act as
imperfectly as possible," thus justifying an allocation of only likely prejudicial effect. S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 139 (4th ed. 1986)
(emphasis original).
Such recommendations miss a fundamental point. In a jury trial, the probative value that
counts is the assistance the offered evidence will provide the jury toward reaching a more correct
determination of what happened during the events in issue. This will depend in part on the
incremental value of the evidence in question-what the evidence adds to the basis the jury
already has for making that determination-and in part on the jury's ability to comprehend the
legitimate force of the evidence as an indicator of historical reality. Evidence that might be
powerfully persuasive to a nuclear physicist would be of no probative value to a jury that found it
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It is important to recognize that prejudice-reducing measures, even
if effective, serve only to reduce the risk of prejudice before the Rule
403 balancing test is applied. The fact that the danger of prejudice is
weighed and balanced after prejudice-reducing measures are taken
into account is important to an evaluation of the constitutionality of
the Rule 403 allocation of burdens. It means that such measures,
while significant in a prebalancing assessment of the likelihood of prej-
udice, cannot be regarded as a cure for any tendency toward error
produced by the balancing test itself.1 1 3
Thus, the three "dangers" addressed by the rule, unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury, concern predictions
that the admission of evidence will produce normative error by invit-
ing impermissible grounds for a decision, or factual error by inviting
misestimation of the fair weight of the evidence by the jury or by mis-
directing the jury from the legitimate issues in the case. 14 If the pro-
bative value of evidence offered by the prosecution is its expected
tendency to lead the jury to a correct decision, unfair prejudice means
its tendency to lead the jury to normative or factual error. The Rule
403 balancing test for criminal cases therefore can be paraphrased to
incomprehensible. In addition, often there will be considerable room for difference of opinion
among judges and lawyers about what the probative force of a given item of evidence might be.
Professor Gold concludes that
[P]robative value under Rule 403 can and should be accurately measured by considering
both the degree to which the evidence increases the certainty of the existence of a fact in
issue, given the other evidence in the case, as well as the probability the jury will correctly
perceive the degree of certainty and the fact affected.
Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11, at 79.
Thus, fair assessments of both probative value and prejudicial potential must take into account
uncertainties about the actual impact of the evidence on a jury and can be, at best, no more than
estimations of the probable benefits and costs of admission.
113. "Unfair prejudice" in a Rule 403 equation is therefore a measure of the judicially-
predetermined likelihood of erroneous decisionmaking that would be induced by admission of
the evidence. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), the Supreme Court found potential for
a violation of Winship whenever there is a reasonable possibility of adverse impact on a
factfinder's application of the reasonable doubt standard. See supra notes 39-43 and
accompanying text. A trial court facing an admissibility determination under Rule 403 thus
confronts risks of constitutional dimension, in Franklin terms, whenever the court sees any
significant danger of unfair prejudice that could affect the factfinder's application of the
reasonable doubt standard to the proof or the substantive reliability of its determination of guilt.
114. The Rule's list of negative values lumps together, as equivalents for balancing purposes,
two categories of evidence that implicate vastly different values: First, concerns of importance to
the reliability of the trial process-the prejudice, misleading, and confusion dangers-and
second, time-wasting considerations of inconceivable impact on fundamental interests except
when used to exclude evidence offered by an accused.
This undifferentiated treatment of two matters, one of potential adverse impact on the most
fundamental of process values and the other of mundane significance, is reason in itself to
question the integrity of the Rule's balancing equation.
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read, "Evidence offered by the prosecution shall not be excluded
because it may lead to an erroneous conviction unless that risk is sub-
stantially greater than the possibility that it will lead to a correct
conviction."
2. The Impacts of Prejudicial Evidence on Reliable Decisionmaking
The mechanisms by which prejudicial evidence influences decision-
making processes are only imperfectly understood," 5 but courts and
scholars have long believed that some kinds of evidence can have
profound reliability-threatening impacts on the outcome of trials.
Accordingly, judicial control of the use of potentially prejudicial evi-
dence has been in existence for over three hundred years.'
16
Dangers of unfair prejudice can arise in a number of ways. For
example, evidence may demonstrate a defendant's unsavory or
immoral character, 117 or unpopular or contemptible associations 1 8 or
beliefs 1 9 that could arouse juror antagonism; it may vividly portray
gruesome 120 or offensive 21 aspects of the charged crime or otherwise
overemphasize negative connotations, 122 inciting a jury's vindictive-
115. Common sense and intuition have provided the primary bases for traditional
assumptions about the need for judicial control of potentially prejudicial evidence. Recently,
however, empiricists and cognitive psychologists have produced support for many of these
assumptions. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (empirical support for reliability
concerns).
116. See Reed, supra note 12, at 717 (providing an extensive review of the historical
development of doctrine for the exclusion of uncharged misconduct evidence).
117. See, eg., United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant's vulgar
conversation with government informant, an admitted criminal, "suffused with an aura of non-
specific criminality").
118. See, eg., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (membership in secret prison
organization, whose members were required to lie, cheat, steal and kill to protect each other);
United States v. Turoff, 291 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant's active participation in
Communist Party); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.) (membership in
Comiftunist Party), cerL denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); see also infra note 223 (discussion of article
finding constitutional demand for caution in admission of prejudicial evidence of speech or
association).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986) (in civil rights
prosecution, defendant's alleged racist remarks eight years prior); United States v. Moon, 718
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); United States v. Sickles, 524 F. Supp.
506 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1982).
120. See e.g., United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981) (in child abuse
prosecution, color photograph of child's lacerated heart); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.)
(autopsy slides of rape victim's genital area), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1035 (1981).
121. United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (in prosecution for importing goods
by use of false statements, list of actual titles and sexually explicit brochure).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1978) (in drug prosecution,
expert testimony about effects of drug); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978) (in
prosecution for sale of guns without paying tax, testimony describing weapons as gangster
weapons and antipersonnel devices).
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ness; it may invite unwarranted conclusions or lead to confusion of the
issues, 123 generating a risk of factfinding mistake; or it may unreasona-
bly appeal to a jury's emotions12 4 or prejudices. 125
One form of potentially prejudicial evidence, evidence of uncharged
misconduct by the accused, 126 is routinely involved in criminal tri-
als 127 and has generated what has been called a "staggering" body of
commentary. 128 With rare exception, courts and commentators have
agreed that uncharged misconduct evidence can have decisive influ-
ence on criminal trials as a result of unreliable, emotional, or irrational
impacts on the jury's factfinding process. 129
123. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) (use of "net worth" accounting
approach in tax evasion prosecutions); United States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979)
(mathematical probability proof); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976)
(written transcripts of previous testimony as exhibits; risk of undue weight), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Stabler, 490 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1974) (photograph of
defendant's clothing showing unexplained bloodstain); United States v. Traficant, 566 F. Supp.
1046 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (voice stress lie detection tests; risk jury might substitute results for
required fact findings).
124. United States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985) (in prosecution for murder of U.S.
Congressman at Jonestown, Guyana, tape recording made during mass suicide with background
sounds of crying, presumably dying, children).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Millen, 594 F.2d 1085 (6th Cir. 1979) (defendant's homosexual
relationship with victim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979).
126. "Uncharged misconduct" is the label for this evidence used by Professor Imwinkelried,
who has written extensively on the topic. See, e.g., E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12. This type
of evidence, involving proof of criminal or otherwise reprehensible conduct by an accused other
than the acts with which the accused is charged, is variously described in the literature as "bad
acts," "specific acts," "extrinsic acts," "character evidence," "propensity evidence," or "prior
crimes evidence," and, in FED. R. EVID. 404(b), as "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts."
127. See E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, COURTROOM
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 235 (1987) (Rule 404(b) has "generated more published opinions than any
other subsection of the rules"); see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, q 404[08],
at 404-56.
128. E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, § 1:04, at 8. For partial catalogues of the literature
on the topic, see id. at n.9, and 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, at 404-9 to 404-11.
129. See, e.g., E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, § 1:02 ("Evidence of uncharged misconduct
strips the defendant of the presumption of innocence." (footnote omitted)); Dolan, supra note 7,
at 226-27; Kuhns, supra note 12, at 803 ("[The principle] that specific acts are inadmissible to
prove character to show action in conformity with character rests on the premise 'that extrinsic
acts evidence is fraught with dangers of prejudice-extraordinary dangers not presented by other
types of evidence.' ") (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 920 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
bane) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), ceri. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979)); Weissenberger, Making Sense
of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REV. 579, 581 (1985)
("Arguably no other item of evidence, except perhaps testimony based on personal perception of
the operative facts, possesses such enormous potential to affect the outcome of a criminal case.");
see also infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (discussion of the empirical evidence
substantiating these impacts).
In a decision made before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, the Tenth Circuit
described the practical impact of uncharged misconduct evidence in categoric terms: "[A]n
obvious truth is that once prior convictions are introduced the trial is, for all practical purposes,
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404 codified the common law provisions
governing the admissibility of evidence of a person's uncharged mis-
conduct.130 Rule 404(a) represents the "propensity" or "character"
evidence ban recognized at common law. The common-law rule pro-
hibited the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when
offered to support the inference that a person acted in a certain way
from a general disposition to do so, because of the belief that the evi-
dence would be dangerously prejudicial when used for this purpose.
Subsection (b) of Rule 404 adopted the "inclusionary" approach to
evidence of uncharged misconduct, under which evidence of "other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" is admissible, despite the propensity evidence
prohibition, so long as it is offered for any purpose other than proving
completed and the guilty outcome follows as a mere formality. This is true regardless of the care
and caution employed by the court in instructing the jury." United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d
201, 204 (1972).
For one example of a contrary view, see Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:
Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 (1982), stating:
If we hope to achieve rules that make sense, and if we hope to write rules to enhance the
accuracy of the fact-finding process, we should abandon our frayed pretense concerning the
value of character evidence. A trait of character is, almost by definition, a predisposition to
characteristic conduct under appropriate circumstances.... If the evidence is such that the
jury may infer a disposition to perform the conduct in issue, we should permit rather than
prohibit them from doing so.
Ia at 883. In fairness to Professor Uviller, it should be noted that his position was premised on a
requirement that the character evidence share substantial similarities with the charged acts, a
situation in which some empirical evidence suggests that the validity of a propensity inference is
highest. This is also, however, a situation where the risks of jury misuse of the evidence may be
highest. See infra note 182.
130. FED. R. EVID. 404 provides as follows:
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT: EXCEPTIONs;
OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident
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a person's propensity.' Such uses are controlled by the application
of Rule 403, to balance the claimed "other purpose" relevance of the
evidence against the danger that a jury might also be unreasonably
influenced by it. 132
Most of the scholarly attention to unfairly prejudicial evidence has
centered on the impacts of uncharged misconduct evidence. Commen-
tators have identified a number of ways uncharged misconduct evi-
dence may give rise to unfair prejudice through invitation of
factfinding error and through potential alteration of the guilt-determi-
nation standard. There is substantial empirical support for the con-
cerns raised in that commentary.
a. Factfinding Errors
Perhaps the most easily recognized prejudice risk from uncharged
misconduct evidence is the risk of factfinding error through overvalua-
tion of the probative force of a past conduct-present conduct connec-
tion. The premise is that jurors will be likely to find a substantially
greater probability connection between a person's past misconduct and
present culpability than the connection deserves. 133 There is addi-
tional concern that jurors may unreasonably discount or disregard evi-
dence offered by an accused who has been shown to be deserving of
contempt. 134 Jurors also may be led to error by confusion of questions
131. The "exclusionary" approach followed in some jurisdictions at common law prohibited
the use of uncharged misconduct evidence unless it fit within certain recognized exceptions. See
Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 1467-68 (discussion of inclusionary and exclusionary approaches).
132. The Rule 403 balancing test, which places the burden on the opponent of prejudicial
evidence to show that the unfair prejudice "substantially outweighs" its probative value, turns on
its head the predominant common law test for the admissibility of uncharged misconduct
evidence. See id. at 1469-79; see also E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, § 8:27, at 56 ("At
common law, the virtually unanimous view is that the proponent of the uncharged misconduct
evidence has the burden [of persuading the trial judge that the proponent's need for the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial character]." (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, a number of
commentators have suggested interpretations of Rule 404(b) that would either remove it from
the coverage of Rule 403, preserving the common law burden, or would only partially
incorporate Rule 403, applying it as an indication of the considerations to be made in an
admission decision under Rule 404(b) but retaining the common law burden. See Imwinkelried,
supra note 6, at 1479, 1481.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court held that Rule 403 applies to the
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. See Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496
(1988).
133. See, e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 404[04], at 404-29; R. LEMPERT
& S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH To EVIDENCE 213 (1977); Lempert, supra note 109,
at 1027-30; Weissenberger, supra note 129, at 602-04; Note, supra note 97, at 763-64.
134. See, e.g., Note, supra note 97, at 764.
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about the defendant's commission of uncharged bad acts with the
question of guilt of the charged crime. 135
A defendant may be surprised by evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct, and thus unprepared to rebut such proof.136 This could lead to
inferential error because the jury might thereby be misinformed as to
the true facts surrounding the prior conduct. Although a similar risk
might be present for any prosecution proof of which a defendant has
no notice, the problem can be particularly acute for uncharged mis-
conduct evidence because the evidence may have a powerful impact on
the jury and because proof of the misconduct could resemble a mini-
trial for the uncharged acts on an issue collateral to the proceedings.
Richard Lempert has described a potential for prejudice from
"double counting" of uncharged misconduct evidence, based on the
conclusion, supported by empirical evidence, that a jury presumes to
some measure that a defendant is guilty because the government has
chosen to charge the defendant with a crime. Thus, Lempert argues, if
a defendant's uncharged misconduct is in fact of some relevance to
guilt, that relevance is already factored by the jury's initial skepticism
about the defendant's innocence. In this situation, allowing further
proof of those past acts may produce a "double counting" of any legit-
imate relevance the acts have. 137
b. Alteration of the Guilt-Determination Standard
The following concerns differ from those outlined above in that they
predict adverse impacts on a factfinder's application of the expected
standard for determining guilt or innocence, rather than impacts on
the underlying factual determinations.
Several commentators have recognized that evidence of uncharged
misconduct can lead a jury to convict an accused, even if guilt of the
charged offense has not been clearly demonstrated, because the
accused has been shown either to be a person deserving of punishment
for bad character or to be guilty of other sins for which the accused
has never been punished.1 31
135. See, eg., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 213.
136. See, eg., id.; Kuhns, supra note 12, at 778 n.4.
137. See Lempert, supra note 109, at 1051-52. Professor Lempert cautions that "[s]ince it is
not clear how much double counting has occurred or which evidence is most likely to be
redundant, controlling for this possibility is difficult, if not impossible." Id. at 1051.
138. See, eg., E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, § 1:03; R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG,
supra note 133, at 212; Kuhns, supra note 12, at 777-78 (1981); Note, supra note 97, at 763.
Although uncharged misconduct evidence is the most frequently mentioned source of this
concern, the same risk could be generated by evidence of a defendant's unpopular beliefs or
associations.
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In addition, Lempert and Stephen Saltzburg have posited a
factfinder's diminished regret about possible error in a determination
of guilt when the factfinder learns that the accused is an "evil per-
son." 1 39 In effect, Lempert and Saltzburg have described the possibil-
ity that such evidence could alter a factfinder's calculus of the
acceptable level of doubt about a defendant's guilt, producing an
increased tolerance of potential error in a conviction." 4
Each of the foregoing risks of prejudice threatens the reliability of a
determination of guilt, either by inducement of factfinding error or
alteration of the jury's calculus of guilt. Although a number of those
risks have been articulated only in more recent writings, the reliability
concerns they express formed the basis for the common law prohibi-
tion of propensity evidence."'
139. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 151-53; see also Lempert, supra note
109, at 1032-41. The authors explain the risk as follows:
The behavioral hypothesis implicit here is that if the jurors think the defendant may be
guilty of only one crime, they will not feel that the mistake of acquitting necessarily frees a
basically evil person, one committed to a life of crime or one who has already done sufficient
social harm to justify severe retribution. Where they know that defendant, if guilty, has
committed a number of crimes, the jury will probably evaluate the above factors quite
differently and their regret at acquitting a guilty defendant will rise substantially.
R. LEMBERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 219 n.78.
140. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 105, at 179 (concluding, based on findings of
the Chicago Jury Project, that the presumption of innocence does not in actual fact operate for
persons with criminal records and that if the jury learns of uncharged misconduct by the
defendant it will probably use a "different ... calculus of probabilities" in determining guilt); see
also Weissenberger, supra note 129, at 608 n.87 (suggesting that uncharged misconduct evidence
"may have such a persuasive influence on the jury that the prosecution is not forced to prove the
accused's guilt in regard to the operative facts.... [T]he admission of this evidence may conflict
functionally with the presumption of innocence which protects the criminal defendant.").
These described effects on normative standards could arise as well from other sources of
prejudice, such as evidence of a defendant's unpopular beliefs, associations, or noncriminal but
immoral character, or jury vindictiveness aroused by inflammatory proof.
141. For an early example of United States Supreme Court recognition of the prejudicial
potential of such evidence, one which recognizes no fewer than five of these concerns (surprise,
misestimation, confusion of the issues, arousal of punitive instincts, and interference with the
guilt determination standard), see Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892). There, in a felony
murder trial for killings during a robbery, evidence was admitted of a number of prior robberies
committed by the defendants during the month prior to the charged crime. The judge had
instructed the jury that the evidence was to be considered only on the issue of the identity of the
felony murderers. Id. at 456-57. The Supreme Court reversed:
No notice was given by the indictment of the purpose of the government to introduce proof
of [the prior robberies]. They afforded no legal presumption or inference as to the particular
crime charged. Those robberies may have been committed by the defendants in March, and
yet they may have been innocent of the murder ... in April. Proof of them only tended to
prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real issue, and
to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to the
community, and who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for
the trial of human beings charged with crime involving the punishment of death. . ..
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c. Empirical Support for Reliability Concerns
The extensive history of judicial and scholarly recognition of these
problems is, standing alone, weighty support for the belief that
unfairly prejudicial evidence can threaten the reliability of convictions.
There is, in addition, abundant empirical evidence substantiating the
conclusion that some kinds of evidence can have powerful negative
impacts on reliability.
Professor Miguel Mendez has concluded, from an extensive review
of empirical evidence relating to the impacts of uncharged misconduct
evidence, that "the research casts serious doubts on the assumed pro-
bative value of character evidence and appears to confirm the law's
concern that such evidence carries undeserved weight."142 Mendez
has described a variety of decisionmaking phenomena demonstrated
by empirical research, including the guilt-implicating setting of a crim-
inal trial143 and the tendencies of jurors to give greater weight to evi-
dence of misconduct and dishonesty than to equivalent favorable
evidence,"' to overestimate the value of character or uncharged mis-
conduct evidence as predictive of behavior,' to irrationally discount
the validity of evidence offered by an accused who is presented in a
disagreeable light,'46 and to form simplifying assumptions about situa-
tions based on character inferences and to resist information inconsis-
tent with those assumptions. 47 Other empiricists and legal scholars
have reached similar conclusions. 148
However depraved in character, and however full of crime their past lives may have been,
the defendants were entitled to be tried upon competent evidence, and only for the offence
charged.
Id. at 458.
142. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and
the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1003, 1059 (1984).
143. See id. at 1044--45.
144. See id. at 1045-46.
145. See id at 1047-54.
146. See il at 1046-47.
147. See id. at 1053-54.
148. See Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 556-62
(1985) (drawing similar conclusions and citing numerous supporting authorities).
Professor Gold also has investigated the implications principles of cognitive psychology hold
for the Rule 403 balancing process. See Gold, Observations, supra note 11, at 510-24. Gold
similarly has concluded that "there is abundant evidence that in particular decisionmaking
contexts relevant to the trial of lawsuits [jurors' cognitive tools] may distort rather than reveal
the truth." Ido at 510. Gold describes heuristics and knowledge structures which can generate
inaccurate inferences about events and their significance, discusses their potential role in an
evaluation of probative value and prejudice under Rule 403, and concludes that "[e]vidence of
other crimes or acts of a party, particularly a defendant in a criminal prosecution, has great
potential to induce inferential error." Id at 523-30; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 6, at 1490
("empirical research indicates . . . that evidence of uncharged misconduct poses a grave
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B. The Impact of Rule 403 on Reliable Decisionmaking
1. The Impact of Rule 403 Balancing on Outcomes
An evaluation of the impact of Rule 403 on the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants should consider only those circumstances
where application of the rule makes a difference and need not concern
the impact of the rule when it does not bear on the outcome of a case.
If a conviction would have resulted regardless of the admission of
unfairly prejudicial evidence, the decision on admissibility was mean-
ingless to the outcome and any error in the decision was harmless to
the defendant.149
Rule 403 was not written to govern inconsequential evidence. Its
purpose is to control the admission of evidence that is expected to
affect outcomes. Therefore, discussion of the impact of Rule 403 is
worthwhile only when confined to the rule's impact in close cases
where the admission of the evidence in question may prove decisive of
the outcome.
There are only two situations in which a decision on the admissibil-
ity of unfairly prejudicial evidence may affect the outcome of a crimi-
nal trial and thus where inquiry into its validity is justified. 5 ' The
first exists when a factfinder will not convict without the evidence but
will convict on consideration of the legitimate probative value of the
evidence and will do so regardless of its potential for unfair prejudice.
Here the proof of guilt will rationally justify a conviction apart from
any unfair impact of the evidence. In this situation, exclusion of the
evidence will result in an acquittal when a just conviction would have
likelihood of prejudice"); Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an
Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758, 766-89 (1975) (reaching similar
conclusions about the impacts of misconduct evidence when offered to challenge a defendant's
credibility).
149. Cf Lempert, supra note 109, at 1048 n.63. Lempert writes:
If the evidence is cumulative (in the sense that it is further proof of something that has
been indisputably established) on the ultimate issue in the case (e.g., guilt) rather than on
some constituent fact, a mistaken decision to admit prejudicial evidence should be harmless
error, since even without the evidence a reasonable jury would not have reached a different
conclusion.
Id.
150. As a device governing the admission of evidence at trial, the rule's only direct impact is
on the trial stage of a criminal prosecution. Clearly, however, a defendant's plea bargaining
decisions may be affected by expectations about the likelihood of potentially prejudicial evidence
being admitted at trial. This might mean, for example, that an innocent defendant who can
anticipate that unfairly prejudicial evidence will be admitted at trial will have increased reason to
plead guilty to a reduced charge to avoid an erroneous conviction of a more serious offense, or to
avoid the risk of a harsher sentence following a trial conviction rendered more likely because of
the prejudicial evidence. Thus, the rule may affect a defendant's interests regardless of whether
evidence is admitted under the rule at trial.
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been obtained through its admission; in other words, exclusion will
result in the erroneous acquittal of a guilty defendant.
The second situation exists when the factfinder would not convict if
it considered only the legitimate probative value of the evidence but
will convict because of unfair prejudice from the evidence. In this sit-
uation admission of the evidence will produce an erroneous convic-
tion, where in fact the jury would have had reasonable doubt about the
defendant's guilt if it had considered only the legitimate force of the
government's proof.
In the real world the trial judge does not know, at the time of a
ruling on the admission of the evidence, whether the evidence will
prove decisive to a conviction. The jury's appraisal of other evidence
in the case and its group judgment about the certainty of proof neces-
sary to convict in the particular case, factors beyond the judge's ken,
will determine how close to a conviction the jury would be without the
evidence. Nor can the judge know, if the evidence proves decisive,
whether the legitimate probative force of the evidence is sufficient to
convince the jury of guilt or whether instead it will be the prejudicial
effect that carries the jury to the point of a conviction. The only infor-
mation the court can know with certainty is the court's assessment of
the probative value and danger of unfair prejudice presented by the
evidence. What the court can do is estimate the legitimate probative
value of the evidence (the extent to which the evidence could move the
jury toward a legitimate conviction) and its prejudicial potential (the
extent to which it could move the jury toward error). The court must
base its admission decision on the potential impact of the evidence on
the outcome-on the comparative potential of the evidence for pro-
ducing a correct or an erroneous conviction.
A rule governing the admission of the evidence, therefore, must
assume that the evidence could have decisive impact, and the implica-
tions of that impact must be judged by the comparative extent to
which the probative value and unfair prejudice from the evidence may
induce a conviction. If, for example, a court admits evidence that has
equivalent probative value and danger of prejudice, in the close cases
where the evidence proves decisive the effect of its admission will be to
make an erroneous conviction and a correct one equally probable. 151
151. The foregoing analysis perhaps ignores another possible result, that the prejudicial
impact of the evidence would in fact be the decisive factor in producing a conviction of a
factually guilty defendant whom the jury erroneously would have acquitted based solely on the
legitimate probative value of the evidence in question and the prosecution's other proof in the
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In the context of a civil case, a balancing test weighted in favor of
the admission of probative but prejudicial evidence may be reasonable
because an inaccurate result favoring a plaintiff is no more or less odi-
ous than one favoring a defendant. 15 2 Moreover, in a civil case con-
cern about prejudice is essentially party-neutral, since prejudicial
evidence is as likely to be offered by or against one party as the other.
Thus, the reasonable measure of the merit of a rule governing the
receipt of evidence in civil cases should be whether the rule promotes
factually correct outcomes more often than incorrect outcomes.153
Here any balance in favor of historically accurate determinations in
the run of cases is a positive balance; the goals of the judicial system
are served by any device that more often than not promotes a histori-
cally correct decision.
In contrast, basic precepts of criminal justice favor the accused.
These precepts demand a substantial bias in the controls on decision-
making, in favor of extraordinary care to avoid erroneous convictions.
case. In other words, the analysis perhaps too readily concludes that a conviction resulting from
the prejudicial impact is an erroneous conviction.
There are at least two reasons to reject this objection. First, any rule that encourages the
admission of additional evidence having a tendency to convict will result in a greater number of
convictions, and some portion of the additional defendants thereby convicted will be factually
guilty. For example, this would be true of a rule that permitted the introduction of evidence of
purely prejudicial content having no probative value, or, to cite the most extreme example, of a
procedural rule that simply convicted everyone charged with crime without a trial. Neither of
those rules could be justified by the increased number of correct convictions they would produce.
Instead, the legitimate inquiry has to be whether the corresponding risk of convicting innocents
generated by such a rule is consistent with expectations of accuracy in criminal procedure.
Second, the objection cuts both ways, and in essence it does no more than point out the
inherent fallibility of the factfinding process. Thus, it is equally true that in the close cases in
which the admission of the evidence proves decisive, some of those defendants whom the jury
would convict despite the prejudicial impact of the evidence will be factually innocent. But given
the inherent limitations on our ability to know historical truth, the "guilt" or "innocence" of a
defendant and the "accuracy" or "inaccuracy" of a conviction can only be judged by the decision
of a rational factfinder making fair use of the proof, applying an appropriate standard of
certainty, and therefore we must accept such mistakes as correct decisions.
152. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("In a civil suit
between two private parties for money damages.., we view it as no more serious in general for
there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict
in the plaintiff's favor .. "); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (the preponderance
of the evidence standard in civil cases represents a judgment that the litigants should "share the
risk of error in roughly equal fashion").
153. A rule may attempt to promote policies or values other than the interest in reliable
determination of the issues, as, for example, FED. R. EVID. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial
measures), FED. R. EVID. 408 (evidence of compromise and offers to compromise), or any of the
evidentiary privileges. In those situations reliability concerns may yield to other concerns
deemed of overriding importance. However, there is no such extraneous policy or value served
by the admission of relevant but potentially prejudicial evidence. Its value lies solely in the
probative force it may have-its contribution to a more reliable determination of the issues.
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Here accuracy in the run of cases can no longer be the focus. An
evidentiary procedure that operates to promote historically accurate
results in fifty-one of one hundred cases and error in the remaining
forty-nine will have increased the possibility of an accurate conviction
in a majority of cases, but also will have generated the risk of an erro-
neous conviction in a near-equal number, a result antithetical to the
fundamental value judgment that the unjust conviction of an innocent
person is of far greater concern than the erroneous acquittal of a guilty
one. 154
The impact of the Rule 403 balancing test on expectations of relia-
ble decisionmaking should now be obvious. The rule directs the
admission of probative but unfairly prejudicial evidence when its
impact may be to produce erroneous convictions in a substantial
number of the cases in which the evidence proves important to the
outcome. Indeed, the rule directs admission even where it is more
likely to induce error-where the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed, but not "substantially," by the danger of unfair prejudice.
If we assume a case in which the outcome hangs in the balance on the
admission decision, as indeed we must if the decision is to matter, the
effect of the decision under the present Rule 403 may well have been to
make an erroneous conviction as likely or more likely than a correct
154. Professor Weissenberger rejected the utility of the concept of "accuracy" as a basis for
judging the validity of evidentiary rules:
[A]ccuracy is analytically suspect as a value for gauging the validity of evidentiary rules in
individual cases. On the other hand, to the extent accuracy has meaning in the context of
evidentiary discussions (for example, in positing probative value in the aggregate of cases), it
is in tension with recognized fairness values.
Weissenberger, supra note 129, at 588.
Professor Weissenberger was half right. If by "accuracy" he meant an actual reconstruction of
historical truth in individual cases, Weissenberger correctly observed that "historical truth is a
useless control for testing accuracy in individual cases because it creates an illusory promise of
empirical testability that can never be realized." Id at 586. And if instead by "accuracy" he
meant a preponderant accuracy in a majority of criminal cases, Weissenberger correctly con-
cluded that such "statistical accuracy is fundamentally at odds with the value in our legal system
of justice or fairness to individual litigants." Ia at 587 (footnote omitted).
However, because objective historical truth is unavailable, a rule designed to control the relia-
bility impacts of evidence can be aimed only at producing some measure of accuracy for the run
of cases. Moreover, and more importantly, a rule aimed at a statistical accuracy for the run of
cases can meaningfuly protect the interests of individual litigants if the rule reflects an allocation
of the risks of inaccuracy that properly accounts for the interests of individuals.
In other words, Professor Weissenberger's criticism was misplaced because it presumed an
accuracy balance that was not weighted to account for individual liberty interests, and it failed to
anticipate how those interests could be accounted for. Nonetheless, despite his general criticism,
Professor Weissenberger did recognize that "accuracy," in the sense used in this Article, is the
issue, when he stated that "of course, accuracy in the aggregate is distinct from accuracy in
individual cases, and the question is whether we are willing to tolerate the inaccurate guilty
verdicts that are inevitably swept within the maximization of aggregate accuracy." Id at 607.
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one. For such close cases the rule has unmistakably allocated a major
and perhaps predominant share of the risk of factfinding error to the
accused.
2. The Impact of Rule 403 on Innocents
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that Rule 403 in its present
form magnifies the risk of conviction for defendants as to whom the
government's legitimate proof leaves reasonable doubt of guilt.
Nevertheless, concern about this risk may be tempered by practical
skepticism about the actual impacts of Rule 403 on the rights of
innocents, the product of a common sense recognition that the great
majority of persons charged with crime are in fact guilty and that the
existence of reasonable doubt as to a person's guilt does not translate
into the factual innocence of that person.155
However, this skeptic's view would squarely contradict the pre-
sumption of innocence, a presumption Winship recognized as "that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' "1156
Under that presumption, when the prosecution lacks legitimate proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant is innocent so far as
the criminal justice system is concerned. Although jurisprudentially
conclusive, that may still be a less than satisfactory answer to those
who nonetheless doubt that truly innocent people are adversely
affected by Rule 403 decisions. For them, common sense may still
argue that the presumption of innocence is an admirable statement of
principle as long as one remembers it is usually applied to the
guilty. 157
155. Compare Judge Learned Hand's comment, in 1923, that
our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always been
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need
to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats
the prosecution of crime.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1923).
156. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895)).
157. Thus, some might argue, even if Rule 403 operates as described it does not necessarily
follow that it has worked injustice, and its impacts on actually innocent people may be negligible.
In essence, this view would contend that the only legitimate concern for criminal trial procedures
is with their impact on defendants who are factually innocent of the charges against them. By
this view, the defendant who in fact has committed the crime charged would have no legitimate
basis for complaining about any procedure by which the conviction was obtained-or, at least,
those who critique the procedures should not be too concerned with the procedural interests of
the guilty.
There are fundamental difficulties with such a view. As previously noted, we can never reach
the point of absolute certainty in judicial fact determinations and can never say with infallible
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However, this common sense would be shortsighted. There are sev-
eral considerations which strongly suggest that Rule 403 operates
against the interests of a substantial number of defendants who are
innocent in fact of the charges against them, that the inaccuracy-pro-
moting characteristics of the rule are of more than hypothetical conse-
quence, and that Rule 403 presents an actual threat to the rights of
innocents. A number of factors lead to this increased risk, in addition
to the reliability-threatening impacts of unfair prejudice already
described. These include practical reasons suggesting that unfairly
prejudicial evidence will be offered against a significant number of
innocents, a highly deferential appellate review, and, paradoxically,
court-created guidelines for the use of the evidence which, although
intended to protect against error, in fact appear to significantly
increase the risk of mistaken convictions.
a. Filtering Innocents
Government investigatory, charging, and prosecutorial practices
may combine to magnify the risk that persons with criminal records,
who are particularly exposed to risks of prejudice when evidence of
their past misconduct is admitted at trial, will be tried for crimes they
did not commit.
precision which persons charged with crime are factually guilty and which are not. Accordingly,
one cannot credit a criminal procedure without acknowledging the inevitability of its application
to innocents and the impossibility of knowing exactly when that will happen.
In addition, there are other values involved in a criminal justice system that support concern
for the factually guilty defendants as well. For example, concern for the integrity of the criminal
adjudication process could justify concern for those who, though factually guilty, are convicted
by procedures that shake our confidence in the reliability of the conviction. Moreover, even if
that confidence is unaffected, we might justifiably reject convictions of guilty persons because the
process afforded them was unfair, because uncivilized or barbaric governmental conduct led to
the conviction, or because the prosecution infringed on other values important to a free society.
See, eg., Tribe, Tial by Mathematics" Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 1329 (1971). Professor Tribe writes:
t!]he acceptability of a process is not simply a function of the number of correct or
erroneous convictions or acquittals it yields.... [Olur preferences... attach not to the bare
consequences of correct or erroneous conviction or acquittal. They attach instead, and
properly so, to the consequences ... of the defendant's correct or erroneous conviction or
acquittal after a given sort of trial, operating with a particular set of rules and biases, and
governed by a specific standard of proof.
Id. at 1382 (footnote omitted).
But the problems engendered by the current treatment of evidence of other wrongs are evident
even if we disregard the process interests of factually guilty defendants and consider only the
impact of this treatment on persons who are factually innocent. The arguments advanced in this
Article are largely directed at the impact of Rule 403 on the factually innocent defendant without
regard to the process values that concern factually guilty defendants as well.
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First, the possibility of mistaken charges would appear greater for
those with criminal records. Lempert and Saltzburg have noted that
[P]olice work is organized so that persons mistakenly charged are likely
to have criminal records. This is most obvious where the decision to
charge results from mistaken eyewitness identification ... [which] very
often begins with the presentation to witnesses of pictures from the
police files. One does not get his picture in those files unless he has been
in trouble with the law. It is also true when police concentrate their
attention on a group of "usual suspects." One is not a "usual suspect"
without a history of past crimes.' 58
In addition, there is good reason to believe (and to hope) that persons
erroneously charged with crimes will be substantially more likely than
those who are guilty to insist on a trial, rather than enter a plea bar-
gain. Lempert and Saltzburg have predicted this impact:
For a variety of reasons .... an individual with a past record is severely
disadvantaged if he chooses to go to trial. Thus we can expect that guilty
individuals with past records are disproportionately likely to take
advantage of any leniency associated with pretrial guilty pleas. This
would be because the person with a record would estimate a lower
chance of being found not guilty than a person without a record and
would thus perceive the likely risk of going to trial, with the generally
more severe sentences that follow conviction, as greater .... However,
the innocent with past records are probably more likely to stand trial,
since there are issues of principle and basic justice involved and since the
fact of innocence suggests the prosecutor's case will be weak.159
Although these comments were intended to demonstrate the weak-
ness of a "propensity" relevance argument, they are equally cogent for
their suggestions that, first, prosecutorial practices are likely to focus
on persons with criminal records, whether guilty or innocent, and sec-
158. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 211-12 (footnote omitted). A
substantial body of empirical research indicates the potential for highly confident, but mistaken,
eyewitness identifications. See generally E. ARNOLDS, W. CARROLL, M. LEWIS & M. SENG,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY STRATEGIES AND TACTICS (1984); L. TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION (1982); G. WELLS & E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1984).
Concentrating investigations on persons with criminal records may be a useful investigative
approach and may enhance the accuracy of charges. However, it also might divert attention
from the real culprit or lead investigators to overlook evidence pointing to a different suspect.
More significantly, prosecutorial authorities probably are not immune to the incriminating but
unreliable inferences that knowledge of a person's criminal record has been shown to raise in
decisionmakers in other contexts, and there is evidence that that knowledge is in fact influential
in prosecutorial decisions. See infra note 163 (effect of criminal record on prosecutors' plea
bargaining decisions). Accordingly, persons with criminal records are peculiarly vulnerable to
mistaken charges.
159. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 211 (footnote incorporated into
quoted text).
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ond, that of all persons charged with crime, innocents are more likely
actually to stand trial. The comments describe a "filtering" process by
which defendants actually tried, and thus subjected to the operation of
Rule 403, will include a disproportionately large number of factually
innocent persons, of whom many will have criminal records. The-pop-
ulation of criminal defendants actually tried on charges can thus be
expected to consist of a relatively small percentage of the overall popu-
lation of factually guilty persons and a much larger percentage of fac-
tually innocent ones. This suggests that because innocents are more
likely to stand on their rights they are disproportionately likely, if they
have a criminal record, to confront prejudice risks at trial from evi-
dence of their past misconduct, and, whether or not they have a crimi-
nal record, to be subjected to the danger of unfair prejudice from other
forms of potentially prejudicial evidence as well.
The possible impacts of this "filtering" process on the criminal trial
process could be dramatic. Assume a prosecutorial system which is
ninety percent reliable; that is, nine out of every ten persons against
whom charges are filed are actually guilty of the crimes charged, and
one is actually innocent. 1" Assume further that half of the innocents
persuade the prosecutor to drop charges or reduce the charges to
crimes they did commit, or plead guilty to crimes they did not com-
mit.161 For every one hundred criminal charges filed we would find
five innocent persons standing trial. Experience suggests that a great
majority-perhaps as many as ninety percent-of the persons initially
charged will avoid trial by entering a plea.162 Under these assump-
160. Objective support for this assumption of 90% reliability is, of course, unavailable.
However, according to one writer who has conducted an extensive study of plea bargaining, this
90% estimate is "given by almost all experienced defense attorneys." M. HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATrORNEYS 58
(1978).
161. Indeed, the fact that Rule 403 makes the admission of unfairly prejudiciai evidence likely
may have the effect of inducing factually innocent defendants against whom such evidence will be
offered at trial to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit. See supra note 150.
The social costs and benefits of the plea bargaining system have been the subject of a
substantial and growing body of scholarly inquiry. For one view that sees significant risks of
guilty pleas by innocent defendants, from a scholar who has written extensively in the area, see
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 713-16 (1981).
162. The 90% plea bargain figure was advanced by then-Chief Justice Burger in his
comments in State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970), and has gained popular
acceptance. In fact, some statistics indicate that there is considerable variation in plea bargaining
rates among and within jurisdictions. See, ag., H. MILLER, W. MCDONALD & J. CRAMER,
PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 21, Table 11 (1978) (describing variations in rates
among court jurisdictions within single states, including in one example a range from a low of
11.9% to a high of 98.2%).
For criminal charges in the federal courts, the percentage of guilty pleas appears to be smaller.
For the fiscal year 1985 the reported figures showed that of 29,706 defendants for whom a
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tions, if trials are held in the remaining ten cases of the one hundred
filed, we could expect half of the defendants standing trial to be factu-
ally innocent, including many with criminal records.1 63
Thus, to the extent there is room for error in the system's mecha-
nisms for pretrial determination of guilt, the error is likely to be mag-
nified in terms of the proportion of innocent persons made to stand
trial. When Rule 403 permits the introduction of unfairly prejudicial
evidence in criminal trials it does so for this disproportionate number
judgment of guilt or innocence was entered in U.S. district courts, 24,792 entered guilty pleas and
4914 were tried by a court or jury. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT: UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FISCAL YEAR 1985, Report 1-21, at 1 (1986). However, a more
accurate picture also might take into account the substantial number of additional matters
dismissed before they reached the district courts or dismissed by the district courts before
judgment. For the same period, these included complaints against 32,592 persons as to whom
prosecution was immediately declined, an additional 19,582 persons as to whom prosecution was
declined after investigation, another 8233 complaints closed at the magistrate level, and charges
against 3599 defendants dismissed by the district courts. Id. at 4, 28.
In one respect these figures may contradict the filtering hypothesis advanced in the text. The
substantial majority of criminal complaints either were not pursued or were dismissed before
they reached judgment in the district courts. These dispositions might apply to a substantial
number of innocents against whom complaints were filed and against whom the prosecution's
case probably was weak. Thus, the system probably provides a significant screen against unjust
convictions before charges are pressed to judgment.
On the other hand, any confidence provided by that conclusion should be guarded. As
discussed elsewhere, there are substantial reasons to believe many "weak" cases nonetheless will
be pursued, particularly those in which the defendants are most likely to confront prejudicial
evidence, and that even where a prosecutor's case is weak defendants may have special reasons to
plead guilty to crimes they did not commit. See supra note 150; infra note 163. Unless this
dismissal process is nearly perfect in its protection of innocents, those innocents who are
bypassed by the dismissal process will be subject to all of the filtering effects described and, more
importantly, to the reliability-threatening operation of Rule 403.
163. The assumptions on which this hypothesis is based are admittedly speculative, and the
interplay of the assumptions is complex. The analysis here has not exhausted the factors which
might possibly affect a filtering process. For example, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
probably would result in charges being dropped against a significantly larger percentage of
innocent defendants than guilty ones, reducing negative impacts of the trial process on innocents.
Conversely, in a close or doubtful case a prosecutor's knowledge that powerful probative but
prejudicial evidence is likely to be admitted at trial might discourage what otherwise would be a
decision to drop charges against an innocent person. Thus, a prosecutor's knowledge of a
defendant's criminal record or otherwise unsavory character may encourage trial of a weak case
that otherwise would be dismissed, either because the prosecutor believes the defendant is more
deserving of punishment or because the criminal record may help in obtaining a conviction. See,
e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 133, at 212 ("the advantage which past crimes
evidence gives the prosecutor at trial means that a weak case is less likely to be dropped with a
repeat offender than with one accused for the first time").
The latter proposition finds support in the conclusions of a major research project funded by a
National Institute of Justice grant to investigate plea bargaining practices. See W. McDONALD,
PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 80 (1985) (reporting a finding
that prosecutors are more likely to dismiss weak cases only if the defendant has a minor prior
record).
336
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases
of innocents as well as the guilty. This conclusion is more ominous
when it is considered in light of the likelihood that the prosecution's
case against an innocent defendant will be "weak" or, at least, circum-
stantial on key points. 1 It follows that an even greater number of
innocents will be included in the trials of close cases, precisely the
situation where the danger of unfair prejudice from evidence admitted
under Rule 403 is most likely to affect the outcome. 165
b. The Necessity Doctrine and Its Impact on Innocents
In an effort to minimize prejudicial impacts from the admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence, courts have frequently applied a
"necessity" test to the prosecution's offered evidence. Under this test,
a court's willingness to admit potentially prejudicial evidence will
increase as the prosecution's need of the evidence to prove the issue on
which it is offered increases. The advisory committee's notes to Rule
403 indicate that the committee contemplated a similar evaluation. 166
The motivation behind this "necessity" doctrine is commendable. If
the point in question is already established, the addition of the unfairly
prejudicial proof will serve no purpose other than to increase the risk
of prejudice to the defendant. Paradoxically, however, the doctrine
provides the greatest protection against admission of unfairly prejudi-
cial evidence in situations where the prosecution's case is clear and the
defendant's guilt is highly probable, because there the prosecution's
need for the additional proof is most likely to be minimal.1 67
164. Criminal cases brought to trial may largely fall into two categories: those in which the
proof of guilt is so overwhelming that the prosecution was unwilling to offer a "good bargain"
and a guilty defendant saw little to lose by standing trial, and those in which the proof of guilt is
close or doubtful-cases where the defendant either is factually innocent or is factually guilty but
hopeful of an erroneous acquittal. The former category is of little concern from the standpoint of
Rule 403; if the evidence of guilt is indeed overwhelming the effects of prejudicial evidence on the
outcome are likely to be insignificant. One cannot safely conclude, however, that cases where the
proof of guilt is "overwhelming" will always involve guilty defendants. For example,
prosecutions based on confident but mistaken eyewitness identifications might appear
"overwhelming." See supra note 158 (citing authorities concerning frequency of error in
eyewitness identifications).
165. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (illustrating the effect of Rule 403 in
cases where the outcome will turn on the impacts of potentially prejudicial evidence).
166. See FED. R. EVID. 403, advisory committee's note ("Situations [under Rule 403] call for
balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from
its admission." (emphasis added)).
167. See, for example, United States v. Nichols, 781 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1986), where the court
reversed a conviction because of the admission of prejudicial evidence, indicating that the error
was of sufficient magnitude to justify reversal because "[this was not a close case. Indeed, the
government asserts the evidence of Nichols' guilt was so overwhelming that the record contained
no evidence to the contrary." Id. at 485.
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Conversely, the necessity doctrine increases the likelihood that the
situations in which prejudicial evidence is admitted will involve inno-
cent defendants. A determination that the prosecution is in substan-
tial need of unfairly prejudicial evidence on an issue is necessarily a
determination that the other proof on the issue admits of doubt. This
would be the expected state of the evidence when a defendant is inno-
cent. Of course, the question often is not so simple when prejudicial
evidence is offered. The prosecution might contend that its proof on
the issue will not be doubtful when the added probative value from the
prejudicial proof is considered. Thus, the prosecution's argument may
be, "If this 'probative but prejudicial proof did not exist we might have
an innocent defendant before us, but the knowledge we can gain from
this proof shows that the defendant is guilty."
This argument would accurately describe the importance of the
potentially prejudicial evidence in some cases. For example, one can
easily imagine cases where proof of prior crimes or bad conduct by the
defendant would demonstrate a modus operandi so unique, a motive so
compelling, or coincidence with the charged crime so improbable that
the evidence is the most legitimately persuasive evidence .of guilt in the
prosecution's case. Those would also be cases in which the evidence
would be likely to satisfy the most demanding of balancing tests for
admission. But for the more common situation, where the probative
force of the evidence is not great, the determination of prosecutorial
need will be made for a case that is doubtful without the evidence and
doubtful even when the additional probative value is considered.
These are the cases in which any prejudicial impact will be most likely
to play a part in the outcome, and in which the necessity doctrine will
be most likely to justify the use of prejudicial evidence.
A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision applying the necessity
doctrine to approve the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence
illustrates the point. In United States v. McMahon 168 the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens within the
United States. The evidence in question was the defendant's convic-
tion of a similar but unrelated charge three years earlier. The prosecu-
tion's case consisted of the testimony of two alleged coconspirators
turned government witnesses, 169 the testimony of the girlfriend of one
of them, 170 and maps allegedly drawn by the defendant for use in the
168. 592 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
169. Id. at 872, 874.
170. Id. at 874.
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transportation of the illegal aliens.17 1 As the court sized up the state
of the prosecution's case,
The government's case was in substantial need of objective facts tending
to prove [the defendant's] intent to become involved in the conspir-
acy.... The maps allegedly drawn by [the defendant] constituted the
only objective evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy, yet the per-
suasive value of this evidence was significantly undermined by the lack
of any convincing proof as to authenticity....
Without the evidence of [defendant's] prior conviction, the govern-
ment's entire case ... boiled down to a credibility choice between [the
two alleged coconspirators and the girlfriend] on the one hand and
[defendant] and his estranged wife on the other. [Defendant's] prior mis-
demeanor conviction provided objective, undisputed and highly proba-
tive evidence of [defendant's] intent and involvement in the
conspiracy. 172
The court described the balancing test governing the admission of the
evidence: "Before the district judge may exclude extrinsic offense evi-
dence, he must find that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value of the evidence."173 Apply-
ing the balancing test, the court concluded, "The lack of convincing
evidence in the government's case pertaining to intent and the close
resemblance between the extrinsic and charged offenses convinces us
that probative value outweighs potential prejudice in this case."174
McMahon illustrates the manner in which the "necessity" doctrine
can operate in doubtful cases: because the prosecution's case was
objectively weak, 175 the probative value of evidence that otherwise
might have been considered marginally relevant was significantly
increased.
171. Id.
172. Id at 875.
173. Id. at 873 (emphasis original).
174. Id at 874.
175. Other circumstances in McMahon give further reason to doubt the strength of the
government's case, or at least indicate the ambiguous circumstantial evidence on which it was
based. For example, the title to the van used by the government witnesses to transport the aliens
was registered in the name of one and signed over to the other. The government witnesses
claimed the defendant had forged the one's name in signing the van over to the other in payment
for services in transporting the illegal aliens. Id. One of the government witnesses testified to a
key meeting between himself and the defendant in the office of a lounge; but the defendant
testified, apparently without contradiction, that he did not assume management of that lounge
until six months later than the date of the alleged meeting and thus had neither reason to be
present at that time nor access to the office. Id. at 874-75. Moreover, the defendant's estranged
wife-the sister of one of the government witnesses--corroborated the defendant's version of the
facts. Id at 874. A full reading of the opinion in McMahon suggests that every important fact in
the government's case was contradicted.
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In addition, McMahon illustrates a judicial willingness to discount
or ignore the dangers of propensity reasoning when the court finds the
prosecution's need for incriminating evidence substantial. The court's
placement of the evidence within the "intent" category of Rule 404(b)
"other purposes" obscures the propensity reasoning that must underlie
any claimed relevance. The defendant in McMahon did not admit his
commission of the charged acts but deny criminal intent; he denied
any involvement whatsoever. Had the court fully explained its
"intent" reasoning in McMahon it necessarily would have said, "The
defendant's involvement in the charged conspiracy was in serious
question. The prosecution's case was questionable and relied solely on
impeachable evidence. The defendant's prior conviction was relevant
because it showed that defendant was willing to engage in the trans-
portation of illegal aliens, and is therefore more likely to have done so,
as the prosecution claims."' 76
McMahon also should be disturbing for its indication that appellate
courts may have established a new, acceptable class of propensity evi-
dence.' 77 The McMahon court regarded the Fifth Circuit decision in
176. At least one court has openly recognized the nature of this propensity-based justification
for admission. See United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1986). In that case the
court stated:
The "bad character" inference is inseparable from the "bad intent" inference. We do not
pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind without thinking about the other. An
instruction told the jury to do this, but this is like telling someone not to think about a
hippopotamus. To tell someone not to think about the beast is to assure at least a fleeting
mental image. So it is here. Each juror must have had both the legitimate and the forbidden
considerations somewhere in mind, if only in the subconscious.
Yet this unwelcome consequence of using "other wrong" evidence does not make the
evidence inadmissible. It is relevant to the outcome of the case. The risks of error are not
one-sided.
Id. at 264-65.
177. McMahon is hardly exceptional. Similar reasoning now abounds in appellate opinions
when intent or conspiracy is in issue. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446 (11 th Cir.
1986) (intent, cocaine-related charges), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 886 (1987); United States v.
Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1985) (possession with intent to distribute marijuana, conspiracy);
United States v. Lacayo, 758 F.2d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir.) (prior attempted drug dealings
admitted in kidnapping trial to show "motive and willingness to become involved in criminal
activity because of [defendant's] desperate financial condition"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1019
(1985); United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 804 (11 th Cir. 1983) (in counterfeiting trial, prior use
of credit cards without paying bills admissible on "intent to create an illusion of value thereby
obtaining something for nothing"); United States v. Dabish, 708 F.2d 240, 241-42 (6th Cir.
1983) (in extortion trial of gym owner for threatening competitor, threats to another health
studio owner and damage to business admitted to show "anticompetitive intent"); United States
v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.) (intent, bank robbery), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979);
United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1978) (intent, conspiracy to smuggle drugs);
United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.) (conspiracy to transport illegal aliens), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 849 (1978); United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188 (2d Cir.) (conspiracy to
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United States v. Beechum 178 as controlling. 179  The McMahon court
said that Beechum established a two-tier test.
First, the trial court must determine that" 'the extrinsic offense requires
the same intent as the charged offense and that the jury could find that
the defendant committed the extrinsic offense.'" Second, the court
must find that the incremental probative value of the extrinsic offense
evidence is not " 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice'" to the defendant.1
8 0
The court's application of this "two-tier test" makes clear that the
purported "intent" rationale in fact describes propensity evidence.
The court held:
The first prong of the Beechum test is clearly satisfied in this case. The
similarity in intent required between the extrinsic and charged offenses
only means that the defendant "indulg[e] himself in the same state of
mind in the perpetration of both ... offenses." Appellant's extrinsic
offense was a misdemeanor conviction for aiding and abetting an alien to
elude examination, a reduced charge of transporting illegal aliens.
Engaging in the transportation of illegal aliens requires the defendant to
possess the same "state of mind" as agreeing with others to do the same
thing.'
8 1
Thus, the Beechum test for permissible "other purposes" relevance
is satisfied whenever the same kind of intent was involved in the com-
mission of an earlier act as is required for the charged crime. This test
will, of course, be met whenever there is a substantial similarity
between the charged crime and another uncharged act, exactly the sit-
uation in which the risk of forbidden propensity inferences is
greatest.18 2
commit bank larceny), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); United States v. Holley, 493 F.2d 581
(9th Cir.) (intent, transportation of illegal aliens), cert denied, 419 U.S. 861 (1974).
178. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
179. McMahon, 592 F.2d at 873.
180. Id (quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913, 914).
181. McMahon, 592 F.2d at 873 (quoting Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911 (footnote omitted)).
182. This direct correlation between the similarity of a past bad act with the charged crime
and the attendant risks of prejudice is well-recognized with respect to evidence of convictions
offered for impeachment. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985)
("To allow evidence of a prior conviction for the very crime for which a defendant is on trial may
be devastating in its potential impact on a jury"), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986); Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Where multiple convictions of various kinds
can be shown, strong reasons arise for excluding those which are for the same crime because of
the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he probably did so this
time.' "), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 94-95 n.9 (3d ed.
1984).
The correlation is also recognized when the evidence is offered under Rule 404(b) as relevant
to a nonpropensity purpose, although there the courts regard the risks of prejudice with less
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Moreover, there is reason to believe that prosecutors may relax
usual demands for certainty about the guilt of persons charged when
deciding whether to add additional defendants to those already
charged whom the prosecutor believes to be clearly guilty.183 Accord-
ingly, to the extent prosecutorial discretion normally serves as an
important protection against prosecution of innocents, in conspiracy
and other multiple defendant prosecutions there may be increased risk
of mistaken charges. Nonetheless, courts have seen special justifica-
tion for the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence against
alleged peripheral members of a conspiracy as to whom the evidence
of involvement in the crime is weak.184
This increasingly lenient attitude toward the admission of propen-
sity evidence185 may be traceable to the admission-presumptive bal-
ancing test of Rule 403.186 If in fact the rule is behind this direction in
the development of judicial controls over such evidence, similar future
concern. See, e.g., United States v. Francesco, 725 F.2d 817, 822 (1st Cir. 1984) (in prosecution
for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, admission of evidence of defendant's prior
conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed, with the court stating, "[w]hile evidence of a prior
conviction for a similar offense is always prejudicial, the prejudice is frequently outweighed by
the relevancy of the evidence when a defendant's knowledge or intent is a contested issue in the
case").
183. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174, 179-80
(1965).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In a conspiracy
case where the defendant is a passive participant, proof of the defendant's knowledge of and
intent to participate in the substantive crime is a primary method of proving his guilt. The
passive participant's otherwise innocuous and lawful acts shed no light on his state of mind.").
185. Questionable decisions to allow the admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct,
under claims that it serves "another purpose," are not unique to Rule 403 jurisprudence. Courts
have long struggled with the application of the propensity evidence prohibition. See Note, supra
note 97, at 767-69 (describing instances of misapplications and nonanalytic applications of
propensity evidence prohibition). What appears to be new about Beechum, McMahon, and
similar cases is their formal recognition of the acceptability of such evidence.
This change in judicial attitude is demonstrated by a comparison of the attitude expressed in
the Court's 1892 opinion in Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, quoted supra note 141, with
that shown in McMahon. Under the McMahon approach, the Boyd defendants' robberies during
the month prior to the robbery-murder in question could have been called "objective, highly
relevant evidence of their intent to become involved and their involvement in the robbery-murder
conspiracy," and thus deemed admissible. This apparent new tolerance of uncharged
misconduct evidence suggests a major retrenchment of prejudice concerns over the last 100 years.
186. See United States v. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939
(1977). The court in Czarnecki noted a restrictive pre-Rules standard for the admission of other-
crimes evidence and, as justification for a more lenient approach to admissibility, an emphasis in
Rule 403 on greater admissibility of evidence in general. The court cited a number of post-rules
decisions from other circuits permitting the admission of the evidence for propensity-type
inferences.
For an extensive review of post-Rules decisions on the admissibility of uncharged misconduct
evidence, see Reed, Admission After Rules, supra note 12, at 116-63. Reed concludes that for
several circuits the Federal Rules of Evidence have
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developments may compound the reliability-threatening risks already
present in the rule.187
One other potential byproduct of the necessity doctrine merits con-
cern. The doctrine rewards the prosecutor who fails to develop other,
less prejudicial, ways to prove a point. It does not take a great deal of
cynicism to suggest that for many prosecutors this could encourage a
decision to ignore possible alternative methods of proof, or for unscru-
pulous ones, to fail to disclose such possibilities.188
3. The Empty Promise of Appellate Correction
The defendant aggrieved by the admission of unfairly prejudicial
evidence has, of course, the right to appeal the ruling. However, the
chance of success on the issue is remote. 189 Appellate courts apply a
deferential standard of review to trial court evidentiary rulings in gen-
eral and regard rulings under Rule 403 as particularly deserving of
been the source of a substantial change in the jurisprudence [that has] expanded the
admissibility of prior acts evidence to such an extent that a serious constitutional issue now
exists. Analysis of the decisional law [since the Rules] demonstrates that this increase in
prosecutorial use of evidence of prior criminal activity may deprive defendants of their right
to a fair trial and render them incapable of making a proper defense to the charges brought
against them.
Id. at 115.
187. The admission-presumptive test of Rule 403 and the apparently increasing judicial
tolerance of prejudice risks to defendants reflect an indifference to the liberty interests of those
accused of crimes, and a prosecutorial bent. In contrast, consider Rule 412(c)(3), which controls
the admission of evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior when offered by an accused in a rape
case. That rule provides in part as follows:
If the court determines... that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and
that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such
evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies
evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be
examined or cross-examined.
FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) (emphasis added). In the context of Rule 412, "unfair prejudice" pri-
marily refers to prejudice to the victim from inquiry into past sexual conduct. This protection
for victims and the need for a rule to address past abuses in this area are important, but hardly
more important than protection of innocents from erroneous convictions. Nonetheless, Rule 412
provides substantially greater protection for the interests of a rape victim in avoiding undue
personal exposure than Rule 403 provides a criminal defendant in avoiding an unjust conviction.
188. Cf. Note, supra note 97, at 772 n.59 ("Not only is the defendant with the weakest case
protected; the prosecutor who makes the least effort to secure evidence directly related to a
material issue has the best chance to get information of prior crimes admitted. This result
directly undermines the rationale of the necessity doctrine.").
While examples of prosecutorial overreaching are not legion, they are sufficiently numerous to
support concern for this additional invitation to "conviction at all costs" conduct.
189. See 1 J. WErISN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 404[02], at 404-21 ("the trial judge's
judgment of [the Rule 403] balance is rarely overturned on appeal").
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deference.19 This tolerance is attributed to a variety of the usual rea-
sons for deference, including the discretionary or subjective nature of
the determinations required by Rule 403,191 the trial court's superior
position for evaluating the evidence in the context of the trial or judg-
ing its potential impact on the factfinder, 192 and an inference of broad
discretion found in the language of Rule 403.193 In addition, at least
some appellate courts believe that error in the admission of prejudicial
evidence deserves the least protective form of "harmless error" review
because these courts perceive no possible constitutional error in its
admission. 194
Moreover, appellate courts generally have been reluctant to insist on
the use of measures that may reduce the danger of prejudice, such as a
190. See, e.g., United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 1980) (appellate courts are
obligated to give "great deference" to trial court balancing rulings), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000
(1981); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (appellate courts
reluctant to reverse unless convinced trial court acted "arbitrarily or irrationally"), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 905 (1978); United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir.) (trial court rulings
under balancing test reversed "[r]arely and only after a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of
discretion"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.)
("If judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is
reviewed by an appellate tribunal."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).
191. See Long, 574 F.2d at 767.
192. See, e.g., id.; Robinson, 560 F.2d at 514 (broad discretion accorded trial judge "for the
reason that he is in a superior position to evaluate the impact of the evidence, since he sees the
witnesses, defendant, jurors, and counsel, and their mannerisms and reactions").
193. See, e.g., Long, 574 F.2d at 767 (use of "may" and "substantially" in Rule 403
strengthens an inference of broad discretion in the trial court).
194. See, for example, United States v. Huddleston, 811 F.2d 974, 977 (6th Cir. 1987), rev'g
on reh'g, 802 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988) reversing
the court's earlier decision, which had applied the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
constitutional error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), to error in the
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence. In Huddleston, the court instead applied the test
of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (error harmless if judgment was "not
substantially swayed by the error"). Cf United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir.
1980) (harmless error in admission of uncharged misconduct evidence judged by test of whether
it was more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the evidence materially affected
the verdict).
The courts are not, however, in complete agreement on the required standard. See, e.g..
United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir. 1986) (harmless error test for admission
of uncharged misconduct evidence is whether it is "highly probable that the evidence.., did not
contribute to the jury's judgment of conviction" (quoting Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278,
284 (3d Cir. 1976))). Indeed, the Kotteakos test applied in Huddleston appears to have generated
a substantially more restrictive review when applied by the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1984). There, the court purported to apply the Kotteakos
test but found error because it could not "say that the introduction of [the uncharged misconduct
evidence] did not reasonably have a substantial influence of [sic] the minds of the jurors."
Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 783. A test that finds harmful error when the court cannot say that the
error did not have a substantial influence on the jury's decision sounds much like a "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" review.
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requirement of advance notice by the prosecution of its intent to offer
potentially prejudicial evidence, 195 withholding of the evidence until
rebuttal when its need and probative value can be best assessed, 1
96
mandatory acceptance of defense offers to stipulate to the issues for
which the evidence is offered, 197 and even a requirement that the gov-
ernment or the trial court identify the theory of relevance on which
the offer is based.198
Appellate courts may be more insistent on the use of limiting
instructions. For example, they frequently note the giving of such
195. One commentator has argued that such notice is required by the sixth amendment. See
Reed, Admission After Rules, supra note 12, at 167; see also E. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, §
9:09, at 22 (requirement of notice "seems both justifiable and salutary"). Some state court
decisions or rules require notice, but the federal courts have generally rejected such a
requirement under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See ia at 20-21. Compare United States v.
Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1440 (1lth Cir. 1986) (government's filing of notice in response to
magistrate's order granting defense motion for notice was "voluntary discovery," since no notice
is required by Rules), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1567 (1987) with United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d
517, 526 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court "suggests" government should give such notice in the
future).
196. Some courts have recognized the importance of a contextual assessment of the probative
value of the evidence and the existence of a real dispute over the issue on which it is offered,
preferring the reservation of uncharged misconduct evidence until the prosecution's rebuttal.
See, eg., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Crawford,
438 F.2d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 1971) (policy of reserving evidence deserves serious consideration).
This preference has proved tenuous, at least for some issues. Thus, courts acknowledging the
preference have found it sufficiently countered by circumstances making clear that the defense
will be lack of knowledge or intent, or merely by the entry of a not guilty plea in a conspiracy
case. See, eg., United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1334-35
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383
(5th Cir. 1980).
197. Occasionally, courts have indicated that such offers should operate to bar use of the
evidence. See, eg., Roberts, 619 F.2d at 383 n.2 (evidence barred where defendant stipulates the
charged acts prove intent if he is found to have committed them); United States v. Manafzadeh,
592 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979). However, there is disagreement among the circuits on the
wisdom of required acceptance of such stipulations. See, eg., United States v. Chaimson, 760
F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting approach of other circuits that require acceptance
"because, in effect, it allows defendant to remove intent as an element of the crime charged"
when specific intent is an element); see also United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 949 (8th Cir.)
(affirming trial court's refusal to require government to accept defense stipulation, stating,
"[g]enerally, the government is not bound by a.defendant's offer to stipulate to an element of a
crime"), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986).
198. See, e'g., United States v. Gallo, 782 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (4th Cir. 1986). Other appellate
decisions demand identification of the basis of the offer. See, eg., United States v. Schwartz, 790
F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1986) (indicating failure to specify purpose of offer contributed to
error); United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting requirement in
the Ninth Circuit that government "articulate precisely" the theory of admission). However,
even where a court has approved such a requirement the failure to comply may be of little
consequence. See, eg., United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 779-83 (7th Cir. 1984)
(criticizing failure to specify purpose, nonetheless searching for possible basis for admission).
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instructions as a basis for concluding that evidence satisfied the Rule
403 test. It is, however, difficult to locate decisions which find the
failure to give limiting instructions reversible error-perhaps because
of the infrequency of such an occurrence.' 99 Unfortunately, despite
wishful thinking to the contrary,200 there seems to be little reason to
place much confidence in the limiting instruction as a protection
against the reliability risks presented by unfairly prejudicial
evidence.2° '
199. For a decision holding that a limiting instruction must be given when requested, see
United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1984). For two Sixth Circuit decisions finding
reversible error in the trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte, see United
States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Poston, 430 F.2d 706 (6th
Cir. 1970). But cf United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1088-89 (6th Cir.) (distinguishing
Ailstock and Poston as involving evidence which was inadmissible for any purpose, noting that in
all circuits except perhaps the District of Columbia such a failure is not plain error, and holding
that such a failure generally will not be plain error in the Sixth Circuit if the evidence has
probative value), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978).
200. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's insistence, in the majority opinion in Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), that
A crucial assumption underlying [the jury trial system] is that juries will follow the
instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial
court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal
conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.
Id. at 73; see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., quoting
and relying on the above passage from Parker).
Whatever the merit of this "crucial assumption" as justification for the instruction process in
general, it hardly justifies a conclusion that limiting instructions are a sufficient procedural safe-
guard against the dangers of unfairly prejudicial evidence. More importantly, the unfair preju-
dice risk subjected to Rule 403 balancing is that which a trial court finds threatened despite the
impact of any limiting instructions.
201. See Lawson, supra note 148.
[I]t can be predicted with perfect confidence that information about a defendant's character,
including evidence of prior misconduct, will be used by jurors to construct a complete,
integrated image of his personality. It appears certain that when the law requests jurors to
give character evidence a restricted use, it demands "a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only the jury's power, but anybody else's."
Id. at 774 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
For a review of pertinent studies of the effectiveness of limiting instructions, see Wissler &
Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to
Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38-39, 43-46 (1985). The authors conclude that
"on the basis of the available data, ... the presentation of the defendant's criminal record does
not affect the defendant's credibility, but does increase the likelihood of conviction, and.., the
judge's limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error." Id. at 47.
For other reports of studies demonstrating the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions, see S.
KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 44-48 (4th ed.
1983) (instruction limiting use of prior conviction to issue of credibility); Brooks & Doob, Justice
and the Jury, 31 J. Soc. IssUEs 171, 176-77 (1975) (instruction to use evidence of prior convic-
tion only to impeach credibility); Greene & Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined At Trial, 9 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 193 (1985) (multiple offenses instruction); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973) (limiting instruction to disregard confession); Tanford & Penrod,
346
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Reversals for error in Rule 403 rulings are the unusual exception
rather than the rule. The infrequent reversals that do occur usually are
found in cases of egregious error, as when evidence with great poten-
tial for prejudice is admitted on an issue beyond dispute" 2 or the trial
court simply has missed the boat by accepting an untenable prosecu-
tion argument of relevance.20
3
There is substantial potential for trial court misjudgment in the
assessment of probative value and unfair prejudice, given the subjectiv-
ity of these factors and the difficulties inherent in an effort to predict
their probable impact on a jury.2" Indeed, judges may themselves be
open to the intuitive attractiveness of a forbidden "propensity" infer-
ence or to the emotional appeal of evidence, raising further possibility
Social Inference In Juror Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PEas. & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
749 (1984) (multiple offenses instruction); Thompson, Fong & Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence
and Jury Verdicts 40 J. PERsONALriY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 453, 461 (1981) (instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence). But cf. S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra, at
45 (cautioning that such studies are "at best problematical because the experimental method
cannot be applied directly to actual juries deciding actual cases"); Tanford, Penrod & Collins,
Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similar-
ity, andLimiting Instruc.tions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1985). The Tanford article reported
on a study in which use of a limiting instruction was found to have a significant effect in reducing
conviction rates in mock trials where similar criminal charges were joined. However, the instruc-
tion used was not standard but rather an "elaborated and strengthened version" of a typical
instruction. Id. at 326. Although the instruction reduced the conviction-biasing influence ofjoin-
der, conviction rates were still substantially higher in most instances than where charges were
tried singly. Id at 329. Mock jurors used in the study were undergraduate students who did not
deliberate verdicts, and the same instruction had failed to have any significant limiting effect in
an earlier study by the authors using nonstudent "representative jurors" who deliberated ver-
dicts. Id. at 324, 333-34.
202. See, eg., United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1979) (in prosecution for sale of
cocaine, government improperly introduced evidence of prior cocaine use where defendant
offered unequivocal stipulation on issue of intent); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325 (7th
Cir.) (reversing perjury conviction where foreman of grand jury that had indicted defendant
called as witness on issue not in material dispute), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
203. See eg., United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.
1984).
204. There is some empirical support for skepticism about the ability of courts to accurately
predict the impact of potentially prejudicial evidence on jurors. See Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere,
& Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of
Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147 (suggesting that potentially prejudicial
evidence has widely varying impact on different jurors, that judges may be equally divergent in
their assessments of the impact, and that judges are incapable of accurately predicting the
impacts on jurors). But see Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11, at 60-61 n.5 (criticizing the
findings as misdirected and contending the lack of consensus about prejudice is a product of a
failure to "give the concept of prejudice intrinsic content by reference to the policies underlying
Rule 403"); Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1097, 1110 n.72 (1985) (describing those findings as based on
"somewhat suspect empirical data").
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of error in court rulings. Other factors, such as the necessity doctrine
and the filtering effect, increase the risk that judicial error could affect
an innocent defendant. Given the potentially powerful impact of preju-
dicial evidence on the reliability of a decision, there is thus significant
risk that a trial court will overassess probative value or underassess the
potential for unfair prejudice in circumstances where the prejudicial
impact of the evidence is decisive in the conviction of an innocent
defendant.
A balancing test weighted in favor of the admissibility of such evi-
dence in close cases will encourage these errors; indeed, it can be
expected to most strongly encourage error in those cases where the
price of error is most likely to be the conviction of an innocent. More-
over, the great deference accorded these balancing decisions because
they involve subjective evaluations also means that error in those eval-
uations is unlikely to be corrected.
C. Summary: The Unconstitutionality of Rule 403
Unfairly prejudicial evidence can have a decisive influence on
factfinder decisionmaking, and the greatest potential for decisive
impact is in close cases where there is increased possibility that the
defendant is innocent. The possible impacts of prejudice are inade-
quately addressed by available curative measures. Moreover, appellate
courts have been reluctant to insist on the use of such measures.
For some kinds of unfairly prejudicial evidence there is a further
risk of de facto alteration of the factfinder's "reasonable doubt"
calculus itself. A jury presented with evidence of a defendant's repre-
hensible conduct, character, or beliefs, or a jury whose indignation or
punitive instinct is otherwise aroused may alter its sense of caution
about making a mistake in finding the defendant guilty-in other
words, expand the amount of doubt it finds acceptable for conviction.
A direct alteration of the standard of proof of that kind can be no less
offensive to the holdings in Ulster County Court v. Allen and Francis v.
Franklin than the more indirect effects potentially permitted by the
jury instructions those cases disapproved. 20 5
Rule 403 provides a balancing test for the admission of evidence in
criminal cases that is significantly biased in favor of the admission of
probative but unfairly prejudicial evidence. It places the burden on
the accused to demonstrate that the prejudicial danger posed by the
evidence significantly outweighs its possible probative value and
205. See supra notes 30-35 & 39-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Ulster and
Franklin).
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directs the admission of the evidence when the balance is close or
uncertain. In situations where Rule 403 makes a difference, the effect
of the rule may be to increase significantly the risk of an erroneous
conviction over that which existed without the admission of the evi-
dence, or even to make an erroneous conviction probable.
Winship and related Supreme Court decisions require that proce-
dural controls over the decisionmaking process in criminal cases pre-
serve the integrity of the reasonable doubt standard and ensure
minimal risk of an erroneous conviction. The Supreme Court has not
yet applied that requirement to controls over the admission of evi-
dence, but adherence to Winship principles demands the application of
Winship to judicial controls on the admission of evidence that threat-
ens the reliability of criminal convictions.
The nature of the constitutional safeguards required for such evi-
dence is found in current constitutional doctrine governing the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence against an accused. The admission of hearsay
and the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence raise parallel con-
cerns. The government's interest in gaining admission of hearsay, as
with probative but prejudicial evidence, lies in the greater number of
correct convictions that may result from the probative force of the
evidence. For hearsay, the predominant competing interest is found in
the reliability risks produced by the use of out-of-court statements,
akin to the factfinding dangers posed by prejudicial evidence.
However, hearsay evidence normally presents a less troublesome
threat to the reliability of a conviction than unfairly prejudicial evi-
dence because the circumstances generating the unreliability of the
hearsay will be evaluated by a presumptively rational factfinder who
will properly apply the reasonable doubt standard to the final determi-
nation of guilt. In contrast, evidence is unfairly prejudicial precisely
because it threatens normal assumptions of accurate or normative
decisionmaking. An assessment of the "danger of unfair prejudice"
under Rule 403 is an assessment of risks of unreliable factfinding or
normative error after error-reducing measures have been applied.
Logic therefore demands a more stringent protection against reliability
risks from unfairly prejudicial evidence than for ordinary hearsay,
where the risks are tempered by the expectation that a reasonable
factfinder will evaluate the proof in light of its shortcomings. Never-
theless, the admission-presumptive test of Rule 403 provides an
accused significantly less protection from the reliability risks of
unfairly prejudicial evidence than the protection that the Court has
found constitutionally required for the admission of ordinary hearsay.
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The Court's confrontation clause treatment of uncross-examined
accomplice confessions provides constitutional doctrine for a situation
analogous to that presented by unfairly prejudicial evidence.2 °6 For
that type of hearsay, which carries special risks of inaccurate factfind-
ing, Lee holds that the prosecution has the burden of rebutting a
"weighty presumption" against the admission of the evidence. 20 7 This
constitutionally required balance is the opposite of that now pre-
scribed for unfairly prejudicial evidence by Rule 403.
When a balancing test necessarily calls for a subjective evaluation
that invites error, where that error could adversely affect the constitu-
tional demand for reliability of criminal convictions, and where appel-
late review offers little hope of correction, due process requires a
balance that allocates the major risk of a mistaken evaluation to the
government rather than to the person accused of crime. Rule 403 fails
that test.
IV. STRIKING A CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE FOR THE
ADMISSION OF UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. The Propriety of Balancing
A constitutionally proper allocation of error risks would permit the
admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence only when to do so would
not increase the risk of an erroneous conviction over that counte-
nanced by the reasonable doubt standard. This suggests that constitu-
tional demands could be met if a balancing test required that risks of
error from unfair prejudice be offset by a comparatively weighty pro-
bative value-to strike a net balance that would favor substantial cer-
tainty about the correctness of convictions.
The balancing approach to the protection of constitutional interests
has been criticized for deflating the constitutional values subjected to
balancing and for generating ambiguity in the identification of the bal-
ancing factors. 20 8 However, the constitutional principle at risk here--
206. See Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (1986); see also supra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text (discussion of Bruton, Lee, and uncross-examined accomplice confessions).
207. 106 S. Ct. at 2065.
208. See Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
For the balancer, constitutional law is comprised of principles discovered by weighing
interests relevant to resolution of a particular constitutional problem .... Although this
conception of law may have brought realism to the common law, it threatens to do real
damage to constitutional law. . .. Balancing is undermining our usual understanding of
constitutional law as an interpretive enterprise.... Ultimately, the notion of constitutional
supremacy hangs in the balance. For under a regime of balancing, a constitutional
350
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the demand for reliability of criminal convictions, embodied in the rea-
sonable doubt standard-itself provides the identification and balance
of the societal and individual interests with which the Constitution is
concerned. Indeed, in this situation balancing is a necessity.
209
The Supreme Court has not used a balancing approach in its Win-
ship-based decisions, although it has suggested that balancing could be
required.210 As already seen, constitutional doctrine for the admission
of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant utilizes a balancing
judgment no longer looks like a trump. It seems merely to be a card of a higher value in the
same suit.
Id. at 986-87, 992.
209. Professor Alexander Aleinikoff, the author of the criticisms of balancing described supra
note 208, recognizes that balancing may be the most appropriate approach to resolution of some
constitutional questions:
There may not always be a preferable alternative to balancing. One must approach cases
and constitutional provisions one at a time. One must ask at each point whether there are
other ways of describing and analyzing this constitutional question that do not raise the
problems occasioned by balancing and that do not pose the additional troubling problems
that balancing avoids.
l. at 1003. A balancing test premised on a unitary interest in the reliability of criminal convic-
tions, calculated to reflect the reasonable doubt standard, would pose none of the problems
Aleinikoff identified in an "internal critique" of balancing methodology, which without exception
derive from difficulties in identifying and/or assigning appropriate weights to the constitutional
interests to be balanced. See id at 977-83. Moreover, such a balancing test would not support
the objections raised in his "external critique." That critique contends that courts may usurp
legislative prerogatives in balancing tests which supplant legislative actions by assigning judi-
cially-preferred weights to the competing social interests in the subject of the legislation, that
doctrinally-based constitutional interpretation is denigrated through ad hoc judgments that cre-
ate new, unpredictable controlling factors, and that there may be loss of touch with underlying
principle when these factors are tossed on a balancing scale. Id. at 994-95.
210. In Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (discussed supra notes 39-43 and
accompanying text) the Court indicated that an evidentiary device is unconstitutional whenever
it generates a reasonable possibility of interference with the factfinder's legitimate application of
the reasonable doubt standard. Nowhere in its opinion did the Court indicate that this possibility
should be balanced against the government's competing interest in the use of presumptions as
guidance for a jury's correct decision in a case.
However, in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the Court introduced its
constitutional test with language that smells strongly of balancing:
"mT1he value of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under the due process clause,
vary from case to case... depending on the strength of the connection between the
particular basic and elemental facts involved and on the degree to which the device curtails
the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence independently."
Id at 156. This interdependence of values, constitutional validity, "strength," and "degree"
indicates the existence of an underlying balance of interests on which the constitutional judgment
is to be based. The "permissible inference" at issue in Ulster was upheld because it was regarded
as posing no risk of inducing the factfinder to make an error. See supra text accompanying note
35. Under that interpretation, the Court's approval of the inference would involve no balancing
of interests because there would be no risk to the defendant from its use. Therefore, although
Ulster does not indicate exactly how the balance of reliability affects the constitutionality of a
presumption or inference, it recognizes that a balance may be appropriate.
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approach that imposes on the prosecution the burden of demonstrat-
ing substantial guarantees of the reliability of the evidence to offset
error risks from the evidence. When the nature of hearsay is such that
it presents a special threat of inaccurate factfinding, the prosecution
faces a "weighty presumption" that the evidence is inadmissible. That
standard is wholly consistent with the conclusions already drawn in
this Article and demands that the prosecution bear a substantial bur-
den to justify the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence.
B. Restating Rule 403 to Strike a Constitutional Balance in
Criminal Cases
1. A Proposed Revision of Rule 403
The constitutionally required allocation of error risks can be accom-
plished by a reversal of the balancing test in the existing rule, to pro-
vide that evidence offered against the accused and determined by the
court to present a danger of unfair prejudice must be excluded unless
the prosecution satisfies the court that the probative value substan-
tially outweighs the danger. As revised to accomplish that end, the
rule might read as follows:
RULE 403. ExCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME.
(a) In a civil action or proceeding or in a criminal action or proceed-
ing when offered by an accused, relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
(b) In a criminal action or proceeding, relevant evidence offered
against an accused shall be excluded unless the court determines that its
probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, and may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'
This revision commands the exclusion212 of unfairly prejudicial evi-
dence that fails an exclusion-presumptive balancing test, when offered
against an accused. The proposed revision retains the existing balanc-
ing test for civil cases regardless of the objection, for criminal cases
211. Additions or changes to the existing Rule 403 are italicized.
212. The proposed revision provides that evidence "shall be excluded," rather than "may be
excluded" as in the present rule. As originally drafted, Rule 403 provided for mandatory
exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence that failed the balancing test. See supra note 8
(discussion of drafting changes in Rule 403).
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regardless of who offers the evidence when objection is made on time-
wasting grounds, and for criminal cases when evidence is offered by
the accused and objection is made on unfair prejudice grounds. The
justification for the differing treatment of evidence offered by and
against an accused is that the constitutional concerns raised by the
present rule arise only when evidence is offered against the accused.213
The wording for the balancing test proposed here is adapted from
that now used in Rule 609(b),214 which imposes a similarly exclusion-
213. An unscientific conclusion drawn from numerous decisions rejecting, under Rule 403,
evidence offered by criminal defendants is that the courts generally have shown no favoritism for
the admission of potentially prejudicial evidence when offered by defendants. See, eg., United
States v. Cameron, 814 F.2d 403, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1987) (no error in exclusion of defense
evidence that alleged coconspirator fled country after his arrest; probative value was limited, and
evidence would have created unjustified complexity and delay); United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d
461,464-65 (8th Cir. 1987) (exclusion of defendant's proferred expert testimony on unreliability
of eyewitness identifications sustained; evidence was generalized, prosecution's case did not rest
exclusively on eyewitness testimony, and trial court has broad discretion in such rulings); United
States v. Dorman, 752 F.2d 595, 599 (11th Cir.) (trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding
defense offer of evidence that main prosecution witness had threatened main defense witness;
probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, no showing of "clear
abuse of discretion"), cert denied, 474 U.S. 834 (1985).
However, at least one court has recognized the different interests involved when potentially
prejudicial evidence is offered by an accused. See United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d
906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We believe the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant
offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such
evidence as a sword.").
The constitutional requirement that the allocation of risk of factfinding error be struck in favor
of the accused should apply to evidence offered by the accused as well as to evidence offered by
the prosecution. Thus, the pro-admission balance of the existing Rule 403 makes sense when the
evidence in question is potentially exculpatory evidence offered by the accused. There, the
interest in acquitting innocents demands that evidence probative of innocence should be admitted
unless the probative value is insignificant in comparison with the 4ttendant risks of prejudice.
The proposed Rule 403 does not change the existing test for civil actions. An analysis of the
propriety of the existing test for civil actions is beyond the scope of this Article. The existing test
promotes an imbalance of inaccurate decisions over accurate ones, a result inappropriate for civil
as well as criminal actions. That result is, however, less troubling in civil actions because there it
does not threaten a constitutional preference for the allocation of risks of error. Nonetheless, a
number of the premises offered in this Article would support a revision of the Rule 403 balancing
test for civil cases to provide that potentially prejudicial evidence will be excluded unless its
probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice.
214. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) reads as follows:
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF CRIME
(b) Time limit-Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible ifa period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless
the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice
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presumptive test for use of convictions more than ten years old for
impeachment purposes, and the wording is substantively similar to
that contained in a revision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404 recently
proposed in the report of the Evidence Revision Project of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Criminal Justice Section.215
2. The Conformity of the Proposed Rule with Constitutional
Reliability Demands
A principal thesis of this Article is that the legitimacy of the pro-
posed revision of Rule 403 must be judged by whether it complies with
the Winship-demanded allocation of risks of error. Compliance will
depend on whether the requirement in the proposed subsection (b)
that probative value "substantially outweigh" the danger of unfair
prejudice would strike a balance sufficiently protective against errone-
ous convictions to support the confidence in the correctness of out-
comes demanded by Winship.
The response of courts applying the identical test in rulings on the
admission of plus-ten year old convictions under Rule 609(b) suggests
it will. Courts have viewed the Rule 609(b) test as creating a presump-
tion against the admissibility of such evidence. 216 Courts also believe
that the test requires a far more cautious approach to the admission
question than is now routinely provided rulings under Rule 403 and
demands a "more explicit proceeding with full findings setting forth
the quality and nature of any possible prejudice to the defendant, 21 7 a
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
(emphasis added).
215. See Rothstein, supra note 12, and related discussion at note 12.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a sensible wording of Rule 403 that incorporates
the words, "Beyond a reasonable doubt." That difficulty probably arises from an inherent
difficulty in transmuting the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt"-a standard that makes
sense in the context of a factfinder's ultimate disposition of a case-into terminology appropriate
in the fundamentally different context of a judge's evaluation of the possible impact of evidence
on reliable decisionmaking. It is the factfinder's certainty about guilt that matters, not the
court's. The most a court can do is control the factors that may affect the integrity of the
factfinder's judgment, to guard against error in a finding of guilt. Thus, the most that can be
done with a reconstruction of Rule 403 is state the balance in terms that will impress on courts
making the admission decision the comparative importance of the interests involved.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 417-18 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Singer, 660 F.2d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); United States v.
Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v.
Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1978).
217. United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 785-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977); see also Beahm, 664 F.2d at 417-18 (rule requires articulation of basis for admission by
both prosecution and court); accord United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir.
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procedure contemplated by the Senate Judiciary Committee when it
proposed the test.218 The Senate further contemplated that a conse-
quence of the more stringent balancing test would be to authorize
admission of the evidence "very rarely and only in exceptional circum-
stances," '2 19 although in practice its impact has been less dramatic.
220
Moreover, appellate courts appear to be more willing to reverse trial
court judgments under Rule 609(b) than under Rule 403.221
Admittedly, this proposed balance would not eliminate all possibil-
ity of an erroneous conviction attributable to the admission of unfairly
prejudicial evidence, but the reasonable doubt standard is a measure of
proportion rather than a demand for absolute certainty.2 12  The pro-
posed test allocates the major risk of an erroneous decision to the pros-
ecution, where Winship demands that it be.2 23
1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981). Cf supra note 198 (failure to require articulation
under Rule 403).
218. "The rules provide that the decision be supported by specific facts and circumstances
thus requiring the court to make specific findings on the record as to the particular facts and
circumstances it has considered in determining that the probative value of the conviction
substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL
RULES OF EvIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cozig., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
219. Id.
220. See infra note 237 and accompanying text (apparent impact of Rule 609(b) test on
reversals).
221. Reversals of Rule 403 trial court decisions are unusual. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 14, 404[02], at 404-21 ("the trial judge's judgment of [the Rule 403]
balance is rarely overturned on appeal"). It appears that reversals occur far more frequently on
review of Rule 609(b) rulings. See infra note 237 (describing reversal rates in appeals from Rule
609(b) rulings).
222. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
wrote:
[I]n a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event,
the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead,
all the factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened.... [A] standard of
proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.
it.
223. For a similar conclusion that the protection of fundamental constitutional interests can
demand stringent controls on the admission of prejudicial evidence, see Quint, Toward First
Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United States v.
Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622 (1977). There Professor Quint has evaluated the first amendment
implications, in the notorious prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for conspiracy to
commit atomic espionage, of the admission of evidence that the defendants were members of the
Communist Party and preferred a Soviet form of government to that of the United States.
Professor Quint finds three reasons to believe the admission of evidence of a defendant's
unpopular political speech or association can work unconstitutional results: A jury may convict
to retaliate for the speech, it may draw an unduly strong inference of guilt from the evidence, and
the admission of the evidence may have a chilling effect on future speech. Id. at 1641.
Significantly, the first two of these reasons correspond to those advanced in this Article as
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3. The Practical Consequences of the Proposed Revision
For some potentially prejudicial evidence now commonly admitted,
the proposed revision would work significant change. The pro-admis-
sion bias of the present Rule 403 frequently accounts for decisions per-
mitting use of evidence when its relevance is tenuous or its potential
for prejudice difficult to calculate, and the bias appears to have fos-
tered a casual judicial attitude toward claims of prejudice from the
admission of evidence. For example, courts may fail to conduct any
Rule 403 balancing once they have found that evidence has probative
value, in apparent response to the heavy bias toward admission estab-
lished by the rule,224 or they may justify the admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence, against claims of prejudice, by reiterating a laun-
dry list of the "other purposes" described in Rule 404(b) without any
significant attempt to assess their applicability to the case at hand.225
A reversal of the allocation of error risks like that proposed here
should produce a more cautious and conscientious approach, less will-
ingness to accept tenuous arguments of relevance, and greater sensitiv-
ity to the possible adverse effects of the evidence in close cases.
The proposed revision should eliminate the most disturbing
instances of casual or thoughtless admission of prejudicial evidence
that occur under the present rule. It also should encourage a change
in judicial attitudes toward prejudicial evidence of no small impor-
tance-a recognition that the consequence of prejudice to the accused
in a criminal case is fundamentally different than its consequence to a
grounds for a constitutionally-sensitive balancing test in Rule 403. Professor Quint concludes
that protection of defendants' first amendment interests demands a revision of the balancing test
for the admission of evidence of a defendant's protected speech or association to require that the
evidence be excluded unless its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial dangers,
identical to the test proposed for Rule 403 in this Article. See id. at 1661-62.
First amendment interests are, of course, fundamental. However, they are no more
fundamental than the liberty interests of a criminal defendant. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (discussing judicial limitations on press coverage of criminal trials: "Due
process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences.... [T]he trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused."). Indeed, first amendment interests occasionally must give way to
such liberty interests. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Thus, much of Professor
Quint's argument would apply as well to rules of evidence that threaten liberty interests alone.
224. See, e.g., Gold, Limiting Discretion, supra note 11, at 61-63 nn.6-11 and accompanying
text (courts either ignore the weighing process or state results without articulating reasons;
appellate courts routinely overlook such actions). But see supra note 198 (efforts of some
appellate courts to encourage articulation).
225. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 404[08], at 404-55 to 404-56 ("[A]
reading of the huge volume of cases decided pursuant to Rule 404(b)... compels the conclusion
that in numerous instances.., the courts recite the list of permissible uses specified in the rule
and admit without any analysis of the proffered evidence." (footnotes omitted)).
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party in a civil case, and a correspondingly heightened awareness of
the individual liberty interests at risk.226
In addition, the proposed revision should generate increased effort
by both prosecutors and courts to identify and use means for reducing
the prejudicial potential of evidence offered against the accused.
Although expressed doctrine under the current rule purports to
encourage such efforts and there is evidence that courts occasionally
insist upon them,227 the rule itself creates no prejudice-reducing incen-
tive and there is little indication that courts conscientiously explore
the availability of such measures or demand that prosecutors do so. 228
In current practice, the limiting instruction probably is the most
commonly used prejudice-reducing measure. Even disregarding the
serious questions about the effectiveness of limiting instructions in
eliminating prejudice,229 courts should insist on a thorough investiga-
tion of the use of other measures as well. Nonetheless, current doc-
trine discourages acceptance of stipulations offered to avoid prejudice,
and there are few examples of court-ordered redaction of proof to min-
imize prejudice. Indeed, the ease with which prosecutors can now
obtain admission of potentially prejudicial evidence would seem to dis-
courage prosecution efforts to discover or offer less prejudicial sources
of proof.
The proposed revision shifts to the prosecution the burden of justi-
fying the creation of a potential for unfair prejudice and the incentive
to offer the least prejudicial proof on an issue. Under such a rule we
might expect to find prosecutors tendering stipulations to the defense
as alternatives to more prejudicial evidence on an issue, with a defend-
226. The decision in United States v. DeParias, 805 F.2d 1447 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied
107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987) illustrates the influence that the generic approach of Rule 403 may have
on judicial attitudes. There, in a murder case, the court approved the admission of photographs
of the victim's badly decomposed body even though it acknowledged that the probative value of
the photographs was cumulative of a coroner's testimony. The court found justification in the
principle that "Rule 403 is to be very sparingly used" to exclude relevant evidence, but relied on
the court's own earlier decision in a civil case for that test. Id. at 1454 (quoting Ebanks v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083
(1983)). Surely something is amiss when a criminal defendant's challenges to due process-
threatening events are determined by procedural doctrine established in civil cases.
227. See, eg., United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 926 (10th Cir. 1979) (reversing
conviction, noting that trial judge had failed to excise prejudicial portions of lengthy
conversation offered for impeachment, "as can be done to avoid ... dangers of prejudice").
228. See, eg., United States v. Dixon, 698 F.2d 445, 446 (11th Cir. 1983) ("While [the
government's chosen] method of proof perhaps exposed [defendant] to greater prejudice than
other available methods, there is no requirement that the government choose the least prejudicial
method of proving its case. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 .... '2); see also supra notes 195-98 (ack of
court insistence on use of prejudice-reducing measures).
229. See supra note 201 (citing authorities questioning efficacy of limiting instructions).
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ant's refusal to stipulate considered in the trial court's evaluation of
how "unfair" any resulting prejudice may be. We also should find
prosecutors and trial courts actively searching for effective prejudice-
reducing measures as a means of preserving the use of probative evi-
dence, rather than the current approach in which the accused fights an
uphill battle in the effort to avoid an unfair trial.
The proposed revision undoubtedly would raise concern that it will
hamper legitimate prosecutions in a system that is already popularly
viewed as "too easy on crime." In close cases the prosecution may be
unable to introduce evidence necessary for a conviction and, indeed,
some portion of the resulting acquittals would be of factually guilty
persons. But that result, while not insignificant, is sufferable if the
present rule unduly threatens the innocent. Moreover, previous dis-
cussion has noted several reasons to believe that close cases, where a
change in the balancing test would have its greatest impact, are likely
to involve a substantial number of factually innocent persons.23°
There are other reasons the spectre of hamstrung prosecutions is
more phantom than substance. In the first place, evidence that is
highly probative and truly essential to the prosecution's case is likely
to be admitted even under this restrictive test unless the potential for
prejudice is undeniably substantial. A foreshadow of this result is the
frequency with which courts have found that evidence offered under
the present Rule 403 would satisfy more demanding requirements for
admission.231
In addition, for some kinds of potentially prejudicial evidence the
proposed revision might have limited practical impact. For example,
when a defendant claims entrapment as a defense, evidence of the
defendant's prior involvement in similar criminal activity is routinely
230. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
231. It is commonplace for courts to state that the probative value of evidence challenged
under the present Rule 403 outweighed its potential for prejudice, even though the rule is less
demanding. Less commonly, but not infrequently, courts have justified the admission of the
evidence on terms that would meet the requirements of the revision proposed here. See, eag.,
United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 1986) (probative value "easily outweighed"
any possible prejudice), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724,
736-37 (5th Cir.) (although prejudicial, misuse unlikely; evidence "highly probative"), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); United States v. Eirin, 778 F.2d 722, 731-732 (11th Cir. 1985)
(relevance "undeniable," possibility of prejudice "minimal" or "slight"); United States v. Stump,
735 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir.) (probative value "clearly outweighs any conceivable prejudice"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984); United States v. Poston, 727 F.2d 734, 740 (8th Cir.) (probative
value "clearly outweighs any possible prejudicial effect"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984);
United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 877-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reversing trial court exclusion of
evidence; highly probative, no conceivable prejudice); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 876
(9th Cir.) (any "slight prejudicial element" clearly outweighed by probative value), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1977).
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opened to proof by the prosecution.232 In this situation, the defend-
ant's "propensity" to commit the crime charged, ordinarily a source of
prejudice, becomes a legitimate inquiry for the jury because the
defense has chosen to make propensity an issue. Similar reasoning
may apply to uncharged misconduct evidence when offered on the
issue of "knowledge" to rebut a defendant's affirmative denial of pos-
session of critical information, as, for example, when a defendant's
prior use of drugs is offered to refute the defendant's affirmative claim
of unfamiliarity with drugs.233 Here, too, the usually unfair inferences
from the uncharged misconduct evidence become directly relevant to a
matter raised by the defendant, and a jury's inference of criminal
knowledge or propensity may no longer be unfair under the circum-
stances of the case.234
When uncharged misconduct evidence properly satisfies such rele-
vance requirements there often will be a minimal risk of prejudice to
the defendant of the kind that warrants constitutional protection.
Undoubtedly the incriminating inferences from such evidence may be
powerful. But the constitutional concern is not based on the risk that
evidence may tend to convict; it is based instead on the risk that evi-
dence will tend to convict for the wrong reasons. If the tendency to
convict is the product of a legitimate and reasonable inference of guilt,
the defendant has no justifiable basis for complaint.
Apart from its impact on the admission of uncharged misconduct
evidence, the proposed revision may have a moderate effect on the
admissibility of other kinds of potentially prejudicial evidence signifi-
cant to a prosecution. In the case of gruesome photographs or physi-
cal evidence, for example, challenge is frequently based on alleged
"inflammatory" potential. Here, typically, the reasoning is that a jury
will be vindictively aroused by an emotional response to the horrible-
ness of a crime, venting that emotion by convicting a convenient tar-
get, the defendant at hand. There may well be truth to this intuition,
and in some cases that risk may be so substantial that complete exclu-
sion of the evidence would be warranted. However, in many of these
situations the danger of prejudice may be ameliorated by the fact that
the prejudicial content of the evidence is only tangentially directed at
the accused. Unlike uncharged misconduct evidence, which invites a
jury to draw direct inferences about the likelihood that an accused
232. See, eg., United States v. Parrish, 736 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984).
233. See, eg., United States v. Eaton, 808 F.2d 72, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
234. For further discussion of uses of uncharged misconduct evidence that are not prejudicial,
see Kuhns, supra note 12, at 789-91.
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committed a charged crime, "inflammatory" evidence may arouse
hostility toward whoever committed the crime but does not directly
single out the defendant. Accordingly, to the extent the potentially
inflammatory proof offers significant probative value it might well sat-
isfy a more demanding balancing test because of reduced danger of
prejudice. Here, the expected change would more likely be found in a
greater resistance to prosecution offers of gruesome evidence to prove
issues either stipulated by the defense, already established by less dra-
matic proof, or subject to proof by more subdued means. Thus we
might expect to find a prosecutor limited to use of the least gruesome
photos available on an issue, in contrast to current practice where
courts often refuse to dictate such choices of proof.
The decisions applying the identical balancing test of Federal Rule
of Evidence 609(b) best indicate the likely judicial approach under the
proposed revision. Clearly, this more demanding test has affected the
ease with which the government can make use of plus-ten year old
convictions.2 35 However, this test has not proved an insurmountable
barrier to admission. Courts have had no difficulty justifying the
admission of evidence under Rule 609(b) when the evidence is of clear
probative value on the issue of credibility, even though it also carries
potential for prejudice. In fact, if appellate decisions can be taken as
an indication of the direction of trial court rulings under Rule
609(b),2 36 the prosecution has a substantial possibility of gaining
admission of plus-ten year old conviction evidence when it is of
demonstrable significance to a case.2 37
235. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (application of Rule 609(b)).
236. There are some difficulties with such an assumption. For example, the appellate
decisions will not reflect the cases where a prosecutor has chosen not to offer evidence of a plus-
ten year old conviction because of anticipated difficulty in satisfying the rule's test. Such
decisions clearly would be one consequence of the more demanding balancing test-a salutary
one, under the thesis of this Article. Nor are appellate decisions likely to reflect impacts of the
test on trial court rejections of such evidence when offered by the prosecution, because of the
infrequency of appeals from such rulings.
237. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 107, § 609.5, at 489 ("Reported decisions.., indicate that
while prior convictions over ten years old are not usually admitted, instances of admissibility
appear to occur with more frequency than 'very rarely.' " (footnotes omitted)). An indication of
the willingness of courts to accept evidence under this more demanding test may be found in the
number of appellate decisions approving admission of plus-ten year old convictions compared
with those that either have approved trial court rejections of the evidence or found a trial court's
admission of the evidence to be error. Of the decisions annotated through May 1987 in 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 609[07] that fit those categories, nearly half approved
admission and slightly more than half found error in admission of the evidence or approved
rejection of it when offered by a defendant. Compare FED. R. EVID. DiG. 609 b. I (of cases
annotated through 1987 supplement, 13 approved admission and 7 found error in admission or
approved exclusion).
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Moreover, the proposed revision should have no impact at the
appellate level on those cases, now numerous, in which error in a trial
court's evidentiary ruling is found harmless because of overwhelming
proof of guilt. If the evidence of a defendant's guilt is overwhelming,
it will be so regardless of the balancing standard the trial court may
have violated.
The foregoing analysis may prove only that the proposed revision
will permit the use of potentially prejudicial evidence in "easy cases,"
where all could agree with the relevance reasoning and where the prej-
udice rislis to the defendant are tolerable. One might object that the
real impact of the proposed rule will be in "hard cases," where trial
courts already struggle with these issues. Exactly so. "Hard cases" in
this context is a euphemism for doubtful, unsettling, or disturbing
questions-the kind that leave the observer wondering about the legiti-
macy of the relevance rationale, the actual impact of the evidence on
the jury, or the factual guilt of the convicted defendant. They are thus
the cases where it is most important that doubts be resolved in favor of
the defendant and against the prosecution to minimize the risk of con-
victing an innocent.
4. Retroactivity
The foregoing discussion predicts the impacts of the proposed revi-
sion on future cases. Current retroactivity doctrine may require retro-
active application of the revision. The major purpose of the revision
would be to "overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substan-
tially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions
about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials," a purpose that
demands complete retroactive effect.238 For new constitutional doc-
trine that addresses such concerns, "[n]either good-faith reliance by
state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed
to require prospective application. '2 39
Thus, an additional and significant practical consequence of the pro-
posed revision could be an invitation for habeas review of past convic-
tions that arguably rest on the admission of prejudicial evidence
excludible under the revised Rule 403. The admission of potentially
prejudicial evidence-notably, uncharged misconduct evidence-may
238. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (White, J., plurality opinion).
239. Id,; see also Yates v. Aiken, 108 S. Ct. 534 (1988) (Franklin does not announce a new
rule but merely follows Sandstrom; state therefore may not refuse to give retroactive effect to
Franklin); Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (Winship fully retroactive).
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be commonplace in criminal trials, and the number of these habeas
proceedings might be substantial.' g The impact in terms of reversals
would, however, be softened by the application of "harmless constitu-
tional error" review to these cases.241 Moreover, as noted earlier, in
many situations evidence admitted under the existing Rule 403 would
qualify for admission under the proposed revision as well. 24 2 Success-
ful habeas review would therefore require a petitioner to show both
the inadmissibility of the evidence under the revision and its poten-
tially decisive impact on the outcome of the prior proceedings. While
the number of cases meeting this test might still be large, they also
would be those where the risk that an innocent has been convicted is
substantial.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 fails to account for constitutionally
protected interests of defendants in criminal trials. In its present form
it invites decisions on the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evi-
dence that.jeopardize the trustworthiness of determinations of guilt.
Appellate review offers little more than a placebo for the risks of error
created by the rule.
The problem with Rule 403 is fundamental: the rule and its current
jurisprudence conflict with the presumption of innocence and the most
basic precepts of criminal justice in an accusatorial system. The cure
must come from a revision of the rule that will reorder trial and appel-
late court priorities to account for the individual and societal interest
in reasonable certainty about the accuracy of convictions.
A call for that cure undoubtedly will find disfavor in an era of judi-
cial sensitivity to a publicly perceived overindulgence of those charged
with crime. Nonetheless, the concept of criminal justice reflected in
the reasonable doubt standard and the constitutional doctrine estab-
lished by Winship demand a revision of Rule 403 to reallocate the risks
of factfinder error in criminal cases. The revision proposed in this
Article would shift to the prosecution the burden of justifying the cre-
ation of a potential for unfair prejudice and the incentive to offer the
240. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (frequency of appellate decisions concerning
uncharged misconduct evidence).
241. The Supreme Court has held that convictions based on intent instructions violative of
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), are subject to harmless error review. Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570 (1986). Because Sandstrom was premised on Winship principles identical to those
that would underlie the proposed revision, the same result should follow for errors under the
proposed revision.
242. See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
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least prejudicial proof on an issue. It also would heighten judicial
awareness of the fundamental interests placed at risk by the use of
prejudicial evidence in criminal cases and would place the greater
share of the risks of factfinding error on the prosecution, where it
belongs.
The price of the revision would be-indeed, would be calculated to
be-the acquittal of some persons who would have been convicted
under the present Rule 403. Some portion of this increase in acquit-
tals will include defendants who in fact are guilty of the crimes with
which they were charged. But a significant portion of these additional
acquittals will be of defendants who are in fact innocent but who
would have been convicted under the present rule because of its error-
inducing structure. If our professed interest in reasonable certainty
about the guilt of persons convicted of crimes is genuine, we should
readily pay the price of the revision.
363
